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The Validation of a Methodology for Assessing the Impact of Hybrid Simulation 
Training in the Minimization of Adverse Outcomes in Surgery 
 
Peter J. Fabri, M.D. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human,” released in late 1999, raised 
the issue of human error in medicine to a new level of attention.  This study examines the 
frequency, severity, and type (FST) of errors associated with postoperative surgical 
complications at a tertiary care, university-based medical center, addressing the 
intersection of three domains: patient safety, graduate medical education, and simulation-
based training. The study develops and validates a classification system for medical error 
that is specific to surgery, affirming reliability internally and externally.  Baseline data on 
the FST of errors is collected over a 12-month period.  A hybrid, simulation based 
training session is developed, validated, and applied to a cohort of surgical residents, 
focusing on the three most common types of errors identified from pilot data, namely 
judgment error, incomplete understanding of the problem, and inattention to detail, all 
human factor errors.  The impact of the training is evaluated by measuring the FST of 
errors occurring during the 6-month period following the training sessions.  The study 
demonstrates that there is a continuous decrement in the incidence of postoperative 
complications and a proportional decrease in error, which starts at the beginning of the 
vii 
 
baseline data collection and continues linearly throughout the 12 baseline months and 
subsequent 6 post-training months.  There is no additional decrement in the rate of 
change following training, and no change in the rate of the index errors following the 
training.  This study suggests that surgical error is frequent (>2%) and principally due to 
human factors rather than systems or communication.  This study demonstrates that 
creating an environment where residents are continuously involved in identifying and 
characterizing errors results in a significant and sustained decrease in postoperative 
complications and the errors specifically associated with them.  Contrary to expectations, 
a validated, well-designed, active-learning training module does not result in an 
additional identifiable improvement in patient outcome or in the incidence of index 
errors.  These results are at variance with many recent studies addressing medical error 
and, if verified by additional studies, challenge several strongly held ideas related to 
patient safety training.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human in 
2000,1(p25) patient safety has become a high priority in U.S. healthcare and in medical 
education.2-10  Earlier work by Leape,11-13 Gaba,14 and many others15-21 had identified the 
importance of active and structured interventions to decrease the risk of error at all levels 
of medical practice.  In perhaps the earliest work addressing the sociology of surgery, 
Bosk reported how an academic department of surgery addressed error within its 
culture.22  Most notably, these studies have identified that the two largest areas of risk in 
healthcare are errors17 related to surgery and to medication errors.  Furthermore, many 
academic surgeons have felt that having residents “in house” 24 hours per day improves 
patient care and enhances patient safety, particularly as healthcare has become 
increasingly complex.  The residents were believed to be able to “work around” many of 
the system problems that have been introduced by modern technology.  Said differently, 
resident physicians, being trainees, are part of the “cause” of medical error, but at the 
same time may have been an important component of the “safety net” that identifies and 
minimizes error.  The purpose of this study is to determine if a structured, simulation-
based training program, aimed at surgical residents, can improve actual measured patient 
outcomes. 
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Traditional studies of error analysis23, 24 have identified three broad approaches to 
minimizing error:  redesigning systems to “eliminate” the risk of error, creating methods 
to “highlight” an error so that it is immediately recognized, and developing approaches to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of errors when they happen.  Numerous studies have 
addressed methods of redesigning medical systems to make them safer.25-28  Like the 
nuclear power and aviation industries, which have served as the principal “models” for 
error reduction in medicine,29, 30 high technology areas in healthcare (such as radiation 
therapy and anesthesiology) may lend themselves well to reengineering in order to 
mitigate error risk.  To the degree that surgery is inseparable from anesthesia, surgery too 
may be improved by efforts to reduce system error.  But when surgical errors occur in the 
operating room, it is rare that the technology itself is the cause of the problem.  Rather, it 
is the human decision process or human manipulation of the technology that leads to 
difficulties.31  It is unclear how much of the error risk of surgery can be reduced by 
redesigning systems or reengineering. 
Team training and crew resource management,32 two terms used to describe 
structured training of dedicated teams in the aviation industry, have been applied to the 
operating room environment33-36 and critical care areas37, 38.  This certainly has direct 
application to the “system” errors which occur in the operating room39.  Many 
“catastrophic” events that occasionally occur in the operating room, such as wrong side 
surgery, operating on the wrong patient, or leaving a sponge or instrument within a 
patient can be “eliminated” by improving the teamwork among individuals.  Similarly, no 
one can argue that improving communication and teamwork in the operating room is not 
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desirable.  But it has yet to be demonstrated that this will decrease surgical error or 
improve the outcome of surgery.  
Some authors have suggested that it is not possible to eliminate the risk of error 
when the principle component is human-to-human interaction40(p198).  This situation, 
individual human-to-human interaction, would appear to be the case in much of surgical 
care, which raises the possibility that error relating to the thought processes, decision 
processes, and technical processes of the surgeon may be an unavoidable consequence.  
Although the group of individuals who work together within an operating room is often 
referred to as the “surgical team,” most authors41 admit that this is a haphazard team at 
best, and perhaps might actually be considered three or four separate “teams” that often 
work at cross purposes to each other.  Increasing communication among these separate 
teams will improve surgical care.  But it will not address the category of errors which 
originate from the decisions and technical activities of the individual surgeon. 
It is critically important to define the types of errors that occur in the operating 
room, their frequency, and their severity.  In addition, it is important to attempt to 
identify the cause of the errors, to define whether they are amenable to reengineering or 
training.  Many error studies have identified a very high percentage (often greater than 
80%) of errors being due to human factors.  Some authors have suggested that this is just 
the “sharp end”42 of the problem, where it actually occurs, but that in fact there is a 
cascade of events beginning with system errors on the “blunt end” upstream in the 
process.  Is this the case with surgical error?  To date, no study has attempted to answer 
this question in relation to surgical errors. 
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Finally, many investigations in human error have suggested that the presence of 
humans even in highly technical processes is essential, because it is not possible to design 
out all potential errors in highly complex systems40(p180).  The creativity and adaptability 
of the human participant allows new and previously unrecognized problems to be 
addressed in real time.  However, given the potential for a large number of such problem 
solving experiences in medicine (and in surgery) the potential for error is probably an 
intrinsic component.  Some have even argued that it is surprising that error does not occur 
more frequently.  If this is true, what is the role of surgical trainees in minimizing error?  
As surgical care has become more acute, more complex, and more technologically 
sophisticated, have residents been the “glue” that holds a loosely coupled, highly 
complex system together?  If residents have served the role of identifying and minimizing 
the consequences of errors that are “built in” to our systems, is it possible that training 
residents to recognize and respond to error will improve the measurable outcome of 
surgical care? 
This study will address the intersection of three specific domains within the broad 
field of medicine: error in surgery, the use of simulated training, and surgical residency.  
This study will develop and apply a structured training module to introduce residents to 
the most common types of error, as measured during the preliminary phase of data 
collection. Creating this model will require the prior development of a classification 
system for error in the surgical environment, measurement of the frequency and types of 
error and their consequences, and measurement of the patient outcomes that follow.  
After design and application of the training program, this research will assess the impact 
of the training program on errors occurring after the cohort of surgical residents has been 
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“trained” by repeating the measurement of the frequency, types, and severity of errors in 
the post-training period and the patient outcomes that occur.   
The specific goals are: 
1. to develop a satisfactory classification for medical error within the 
discipline of surgery,  
2. to validate the instruments developed to measure medical error,  
3. to define the baseline incidence of error occurring in patients who have 
complications of surgery,  
4. to define the most common types of error associated with surgical 
complications,  
5. to measure the impact of an error in the actual outcome of patients,  
6. to develop a reliable training program that uses simulation to train 
surgical residents to be aware of and avoid medical errors, and  
7. to determine if a simulation-based training program delivered to an 
entire cohort of surgical residents can result in a measurable change in 
patient outcome. 
The questions (research hypotheses) which will be tested are: 
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1. Is it possible to create a valid classification system for errors occurring 
in surgery. 
2. Can this classification system demonstrate reliability when used by 
practicing academic physicians.  
3. Can we determine a baseline incidence of the types of common errors. 
4. Can we reliably identify the most common types of errors in an 
academic surgical setting. 
5. Can we measure the impact of error on the actual outcomes of patients. 
6. Can we develop and validate a simulation-based training module for 
resident physicians. 
7. Can a validated training module improve surgical outcomes after a 
cohort of residents are trained. 
It is important to clarify what this research will NOT address.   
1. It will not consider errors outside of the field of surgery in an academic 
medical center environment.  By design, this study only addresses reported 
“complications” occurring after surgical procedures in an academic 
medical center.   
2. It will not address redesigning systems and processes in the hope of 
eliminating error.  The only designed intervention is a training session for 
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residents.  There will be no attempt to address underlying or latent 
problems that might be amenable to redesign or reengineering.  
3. It will not address “near-miss” or latent errors that have not already led 
to adverse patient outcome.  The original design of this study included 
measuring “near-miss” events concurrently, but this was very 
unsuccessful, as described later in this document.   
4. It will not address team training or training in groups.  Although the 
“team” is assumed in addressing a surgical event, surgical residents are 
trained individually. The residents are working in a simulated clinical 
environment with a nurse, but the nurse is an “actor” and not a “trainee.” 
5. It will not address the immediate effects of the training experience, but 
rather will focus on the downstream impact on patient outcome.  Many 
studies measure short term, direct effects of simulation-based training, 
such as performance on a technical procedure or a multiple choice text.  
This study only measures far transfer as measured by patient outcomes at a 
later time. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This study addresses three primary content domains and several subsidiary areas.  
Each has an extensive and largely non-overlapping literature base.  Each of these is 
reviewed individually to provide the relevant background information to inform the 
reader, and then briefly summarized in the aggregate.   
2.1 Literature on Error  
This literature review was conducted by first performing a National Library of 
Medicine search from 1966 to the present using the keywords “error” and “patient 
safety.”  Subsidiary searches were conducted using the term “graduate medical 
education” and the term “simulation.”  All references included in the website of the 
Cognitive Technologies Laboratory (kindly provided by Dr. Richard Cook) were 
reviewed.  Searches were performed using the State of Florida library system on the 
terms “error”, “human error”, “medical error”, and “patient safety.”  All books identified 
in the search were read and critiqued in detail.  The bibliographies of all items identified 
by the above searches were extensively reviewed to identify important prior work to 
avoid omission.  While great effort was made to be inclusive, this work addresses several 
major, overlapping (and some non-overlapping) domains and an immense literature base.  
It is therefore possible that something has been overlooked. 
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Man has been concerned with the subject of error at least since the time of Plato.  
In The Republic43, Plato addresses the “shadow on the wall” and its lack of total harmony 
with the ideal.  Later, in the middle ages, Roger Bacon44 (13th century) referred to 
“offendicula” or impediments of thought and produced perhaps the first “classification 
system” of error, recognizing four “obstacles” to inquiry:  overweight of authority, 
slavery to custom, dominance of popular opinion, and the concealment of ignorance by 
pretense of knowledge.   Centuries later, Francis Bacon44 also addressed human error 
from a philosophical basis, offering a more “advanced” classification system.  He 
described four “idols”:  the idol of the Tribe--the insistence that Nature is as the human 
mind would have it; the idol of the Cave--limitation of outlook making men non-
understanding and intolerant of others’ ways; the idol of the Forum--the undue deference 
to public opinion; and the idol of the Theater--the conditions of the scholastic contingent 
directed at authority, tradition, vested interests and false notions.  It is interesting to 
reflect back on these descriptions as we attempt to understand error in the modern world.   
Each of these authors of antiquity (and others) focused on error as a component of the 
philosophy of the mind, or metaphysics.   
The 20th century saw the introduction of in-depth and structured approaches to 
human error in the new fields of cognitive psychology, neurophysiology and psychiatry.  
These domains dominated the study of error from the early 1900’s through the 1960’s.  
Even Freud45 described a concept of human error as a component of his theories of 
psychoanalysis, leading to the commonly used phrase “Freudian slip.”  Codman, in the 
early 1900’s, introduced perhaps the first structured classification system of surgical 
error30, 46.  He reviewed 123 surgical errors in 337 patients and proposed a set of seven 
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types of error:  “Error due to lack of technical knowledge or skill, error due to lack of 
surgical judgment, error due to lack of care or equipment, error due to lack of diagnostic 
skill, the patient’s unconquerable disease, the patient’s refusal of treatment, and the 
calamities of surgery or those accidents and complications over which we have no known 
control.”  This list is surprisingly similar (with changes in language use) to the results of 
the present investigation.  In  Managing Your Mind 47, Jastrow (1931) presented a new, 
“modernized” classification of error  which defined three subjective and three objective 
idols: the idol of the Self- the projection of the subjective upon Nature; the idol of the 
Thrill- the favoring of the romantic and dramatic; the idol of the Web- the spinning of 
imaginative data; the idol of the Mass- undue deference to popular opinion; the idol of 
the Mold- restriction to one’s own class-cast of mind and outlook; and the idol of the 
Cult- bondage to dogma and ‘isms.  Later (1936)  Jastrow wrote in The Story of Human 
Error an entire chapter entitled “Error in Medicine”, which describes the historical 
progress of medical thought, concluding with the provocative thought.  “Today not only 
the physician must know the pitfalls that are the errors of medicine, but the patient must 
also know them if he too will avoid them.”  Although these writers were describing a 
much more concrete concept of error and error classification than their historical 
antecedents, their works still largely address error as philosophical and metaphysical in 
nature. 
Studies in the 1960’s and 1970’s were heavily motivated by new advances in 
behavioral psychology.  It wasn’t until the late 70’s, however,  that interest in nuclear 
reactor risk resulted in the development of systematic and mathematically based studies 
of human reliability analysis, systems engineering, and human factors research.  As 
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computer power increased, concepts that had been developed in the fields of artificial 
intelligence and neural networks were applied to system engineering, and error analysis 
became more analytical and process driven.  A specific formulation based on a rule-based 
computer system was proposed by Newell and Simon48 known as the “General Problem 
Solver.”  Rouse49, Rasmussen50, and Reason40, among others, advanced this concept of 
rule-based systems and independently developed coherent concepts of human error, 
which built on each other.  Rouse described a problem-solving approach based on an “if 
(situation) …then (action)” approach to human error.  This is often referred to simply as a 
“rule-based” system.    
Rasmussen51 extended this concept into a “skill-rule-knowledge” classification 
system.  This concept forms the kernel of our modern understanding of error.  He 
categorized error as being skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based.  He formulated a 
baseline, problem-solving method using cognitive knowledge, a method used by young 
or new learners, but also reactivated in more advanced learners when solving new or 
complex problems. In this situation, the individual explores a large, internal knowledge 
base and develops a unique solution to the problem (knowledge-based system).   As 
individuals develop a sense of recurrent patterns within problems, they identify a set of 
rules, some formal, some informal, which can be applied in the same or similar settings 
(rule-based system).  When individuals become very familiar with the rules and can 
identify when the rules need to be modified to fit novel applications, problem solving 
becomes dominated by utilization of stored patterns of preprogrammed internal 
instructions which are organized within a time-space domain (skill-based system).   
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Error40(p9) was thus classified (Table 1) as depending on a violation of a corpus of 
knowledge, breaking a specific rule, or the failure of a highly developed skill.   
 Table 1.  Error Classification According to Reason40(p12) 
Type of Error Classification Timing 
Knowledge based Knowledge based mistake Evaluation/Planning 
Rule based Rule based mistake Evaluation/Planning 
Skill based Lapse (storage) 
Slip (execution) 
Execution 
 
More recently, Senders16 brought together 22 internationally recognized error 
experts for a workshop on human error (The Bellagio Conference).  They reviewed and 
discussed the current classification systems, theories of error, and approaches to error 
mitigation and concluded that there is no single, useful classification system for error. 
They argue that classification of error is uniquely related to the purpose of the research, 
and that no single theoretical model of human error will either explain all error or 
eliminate its occurrence40(p10).  Wallace 52 essentially repeated this concept of the absence  
of a unifying classification system.  He did, however, emphasize the importance of 
determining the reliability of any classification system, citing that a minimum of 70% 
reliability is essential to analyze data in a meaningful and unbiased manner.   However, a 
noted characteristic of the existing literature on human error is the absence of reliability 
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testing or hypothesis testing.  This study will address these absences by applying 
statistical design and rigorous data analysis. 
2.2 Literature on Medical Error 
The first modern, “scientific” studies to call attention to the high incidence of 
error in the practice of medicine emerged from Leape’s work with the Harvard Practice 
Group Study in 199153, 54.   Bogner17, 55 (1994), from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, published an extensive review of the published work in the field of 
medical error.  This work began with the concepts of Reason (which was entirely non-
medical) and incorporated ideas developed by Leape, Gaba, Woods, and others.  Gaba14, 
focused principally on error within the field of anesthesiology.  He presented a thorough 
description of system re-engineering for safety and explained the role of team training in 
minimizing error.  This laid the scientific ground work for the first major “call to arms,” 
the now famous Institute of Medicine report in 2000 entitled To Err is Human.  This 
document, extrapolating from the data from the Harvard Practice Group Study, estimated 
that perhaps more people die as a consequence of medical error than from automobile 
accidents.  To Err Is Human, in part because it represented the views of such a highly 
recognized and credible group (The Institute of Medicine,) could not be ignored.  It 
triggered an avalanche of interest in the subject of error in medicine, both in the scientific 
community and in the lay press.  Since then, numerous articles have reinforced the costs 
and implications of medical error.  Recently, many authors have attempted to develop 
classification systems for medical error, based on the early works of Reason 23, 40, 56, 57and 
more recently summarized by Zhao and Olivera58.  Most of the published studies of 
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medical error relate to the office-based practice of family medicine59-62 and the errors are 
predominantly clerical, administrative, and prescription related, while the preponderance 
of studies conducted in hospitals look at medication errors (prescribing, dispensing, 
administering).  Other studies focus on very specific technical procedures, the 
complications and learning curves associated with them, and the role of training on short-
term and directly measurable technical outcomes.  There are no current studies which 
address a classification system for error in the broad field of general surgery or methods 
to address the role of training in minimizing the impact of medical error in surgery. 
During the same era in which medical error was being highlighted, attention was 
drawn to the role of residents in adverse patient outcomes.  Although much of the 
published literature has focused on the role of work hours and fatigue on resident 
performance, the critically important role of residents in both causing and preventing 
errors has also been emphasized.  The introduction of the “Outcome Project” 63, 64 by the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education in 2001 was intended to transform 
resident training from an apprenticeship model to a competency-based model and thus 
assure that residents are fully trained and competent to practice medicine.  Of perhaps 
more importance, however, the “Outcome Project” formalized the already growing 
emphasis of supervision of residents in the conduct of patient care.  Simultaneously 
American society was no longer comfortable having residents “practice” on human 
patients.  The combination of the recognition of the incidence of error, the hazards 
associated with trainees and young physicians, and the need to find new ways to train 
young physicians contributed substantially to the current emphasis on the development of 
high-fidelity simulation techniques in healthcare, and particularly in surgery. 
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2.3 Literature on Simulation  
The earliest formal medical simulation devices were used to train students to 
listen to heart sounds (Harvey).  More recently, mannequin-based simulators65  have been 
used in training healthcare professionals in the technical aspects of advanced cardiac life 
support (ACLS) and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).  Unlike the aviation industry, 
to which medical training is currently being compared and which has had high-fidelity 
simulators for decades, the medical community did not accept the importance of 
simulation in physician training until the public recognized the high cost of complications 
from laparoscopic cholecystectomy66.  Several simulation devices have since appeared 
and have been formally tested and validated67-70.  Recent studies have addressed the role 
of technique simulators (e.g. laparoscopic surgery) in shortening the time for learning and 
perhaps decreasing technical complications71-75.  Resnick76, 77 et al have developed and 
evaluated a set of evaluation processes to assess resident performance.  As reported by 
Gaba14, 78, simulation has become a necessary tool in the training of anesthesiologists.   
Simulators of sufficient fidelity have been developed to allow realistic demonstrations of 
physiologic changes as a result of anesthetic agents, pharmacologic agents, and other 
acute physiologic alterations which can occur in an anesthetized patient undergoing an 
operation79.  To date, most of the published work in the area of simulation in surgery has 
focused on technical simulators80.  There is an absence of work in the use of simulation in 
training physicians to deal with errors which occur in surgical decisions and surgical 
practice81. 
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A number of investigators have looked at medical error with an effort to 
quantitate its incidence, define a classification system, and develop methods of 
prevention. These have largely focused on the outpatient practice of family medicine.  In 
this setting, most of the errors appear to be related to scheduling, communication, and 
prescribing, rather than errors that are directly linked to interventions, as would be the 
case in studying surgical errors. 
2.4 Literature on Graduate Medical Education 
There is an extensive literature on the subject of Graduate Medical Education82, 
including a focused journal entitled “Academic Medicine.”  Although there have been 
numerous articles on the use of simulation in resident education83, including several in 
the field of surgery, there do not seem to be any published studies that look at patient 
outcome as a consequence of training in general or simulation-based training in 
particular.  In 2001, the Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education 
(ACGME) introduced a new paradigm for the education and training of residents, the 
“Outcome Project63, 64.”  This ambitious undertaking focused initially on the control of 
the excessive numbers of work hours served per week by the typical resident, and which 
presumably was related to error and adverse patient outcomes.  Studies on sleep 
deprivation, fatigue, and stress documented the adverse effect of these factors on patient 
safety.  However, a more subtle yet critically important aspect of the “Outcome Project” 
has emerged over the past five years, as the program has been phased in.  Traditionally, 
resident training has been a sort of “apprenticeship” for the advanced training of a trained 
“general physician.”  As medicine has become more complex, it has become clear that an 
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individual is not “capable” at the completion of medical school plus an internship, and 
that the residency is best considered an extension of medical education and training.  
Concepts from the field of cognitive psychology and learning theory have been 
introduced into the medical education lexicon to address the process and methods 
involved in the progressive acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus84 describe the evolution of competence from “novice”, to “advanced beginner”, 
through “competent”, “proficient”, and “expert”.  Competency is defined as the ability to 
execute a task or process independently and without supervision.  Residents, by 
definition, are not fully competent, which implies that there is an increased risk of error 
associated with activities performed by residents.  Inherent in the concept of a 
progressive, competency-based residency curriculum is the consideration that structured, 
systematic programs, formally defined in written goals and objectives, will focus and 
enhance the acquisition of competence in a progressive fashion.  Patient safety is one of 
the “core competencies” that must be addressed within the formal curriculum of 
residency.  Recent studies have begun to examine issues of patient safety within the 
education program of residency training.85-89 
2.5 Literature on Classification of Error (Taxonomy) 
Vincent 30 provides a thorough analysis of the history of error analysis in 
medicine and a context for further study in optimizing patient safety.  Kopec summarizes 
the history of error classification and assesses several classification systems for medical 
error assessment.90  Several authors 91-100 have focused on the development and use of 
classification systems for error and their limitations.101  Studies have also examined the 
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“chain” of events that make up a cascade, leading ultimately to error.20, 102-104  A detailed 
and comprehensive classification system of error has been developed by the Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)105.  
Unfortunately, it is so comprehensive and complex that it requires a fully trained medical 
record coding specialist with supplementary training to be useful.  Other classification 
systems have been “purpose specific” and do not lend themselves to use in other fields or 
circumstances.  Wallace 52and others, in reviewing the state of the art in error 
classification have concluded that a single, all-purpose classification system (although 
one has been developed by the JCAHO) is not likely to be suitable for the “real-time” 
analysis of errors in healthcare.  Wallace goes further to describe the ideal qualities of a 
classification system, specifically that it must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
(MEE) and that it must be reliable (reproducible) and valid (accurate).  This review of the 
published literature in medical errors confirms the remarkable diversity of classification 
systems, but more importantly, highlights the stark absence of credible validation of the 
classification system or the impact of classification on a measurable outcome. 
2.6 Literature on Transfer of Training 
Much of the modern psychology literature (as well as works in the fields of 
education, communication, and engineering) emphasizes the importance of transfer of 
training.  According to Noe106, “Transfer of training refers to trainees effectively and 
continually applying what they learned in training (knowledge, skills, behaviors, 
cognitive strategies) to their jobs.”  He further describes in detail the currently accepted 
model of the transfer process, which includes generalization of training to the job and 
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maintenance of learned material.  Important antecedent work by Barnett107, Ford108, 
Tracey et al109, and Wexley and Baldwin110 provides the scientific background for a more 
comprehensive analysis of transfer and its evaluation than will be addressed in this study.  
However, the idea of far transfer is critical to the analysis of this research—outcomes that 
occur in a different setting, at a different time, and not identical with the trained tasks.  
The published work and formal coursework by Brannick and Levine111  assisted in the 
design of the training session and the outcome measurements used in this study.  
2.7 Literature Summary 
This study utilizes an expansive corpus of literature in the areas of human error, 
error in medicine, and transfer of training, plus an additional extensive literature on the 
subject of graduate medical education in general and the “Outcome Project” of the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in particular.  Since 
the actual work performed in this study is in itself novel, the literature serves as an 
important background and platform for the investigations.  Thus, the specific purpose of 
this study is to examine carefully the intersection of patient safety, graduate medical 
education, and the use of simulation.  More specifically, this study attempts to identify 
whether the use of validated, simulation-based training can decrease the incidence, type 
and severity of medical errors in the actual practice of medicine.  The study brings 
together the expertise of a large number of individuals and entities to address this 
question.  Because this question has never been asked, a major component of this study is 
the development and validation of the instruments to measure error in surgery, and to 
quantify the baseline incidence.   
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 3. Methods 
An extensive review of the published literature was done in May 2005 for the 
purpose of defining the status of classification of medical errors in surgery.  The review 
showed that most studies on medical error were in the primary care area (e.g. internal 
medicine, family medicine, pediatrics) and primarily addressed scheduling and 
communication errors.  Prior work had identified a general taxonomy of error 
(organizational, mechanical, human factor), and this was used for the higher level 
classification.  Since nothing has been published to identify causes of error within 
surgery, a list was generated from this researcher’s prior experience of 30 years of 
weekly surgical morbidity and mortality conferences at two universities (Ohio State 
University; University of South Florida) combined with an analysis of the existing 
literature, previously cited.  
3.1 Classification and Scoring Systems 
Prompted by the work of Senders16 and of Wallace52, which affirms that there is 
no single, standard, acceptable taxonomy for the classification of error, this study 
developed a new classification system that was derived from the strongest published 
work and tailored to the common vocabulary of an academic surgeon.  This classification 
system presumes that a complication has occurred, assesses whether an error was 
involved, determines the characteristics of the error, establishes a semi-quantitative score 
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for patient outcome,  estimates the degree to which the error produced the complication, 
and  classifies the type of error which occurred.    
Error Presence.  Predicated on the knowledge that not all adverse events are 
derivative of an error, the first criterion for the evaluator is the binary decision that there 
was or was not an error.   
Patient Outcome. This study develops an outcome score that was patient centric, 
using a 5 point discrete classification scale, modified from the disability classification of 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners severity of injury scale.  The 
scores used in this study are  
1 = If there was no adverse effect;  
2 = If there was an identifiable adverse effect, which increased length of stay, but 
there was no discernible harm to the patient;  
3 = If there was clear harm to the patient, but the patient either did or would be 
expected to fully recover with only temporary disability;  
4 = If there was clear harm to the patient, the patient is expected to survive and 
improve, but with a permanent disability,  
5 = If the patient died.   
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The outcome score is determined independent of the presence or type of error.  If 
there was no error, the evaluation is terminated at this point, providing only a descriptor 
of the adverse event, the selection of “no error,” and the outcome score. 
Error Characteristics.  For those cases where the evaluator determines that there 
has been an error, the first question is if the error occurred during planning or during 
execution.  Then, is the error a slip (correct action was planned but it was not performed 
correctly) or a mistake (incorrect action planned).  Mistakes are not further subdivided 
into rule-based and knowledge-based, because of the difficulty of interpreting the “intent” 
and thought process of the “actors” at the time.  This distinction will be addressed further 
in the subclassification of types of error. 
Types of Error.  The classification of types of error commenced with the three 
broad categories of error: organizational or system error, technical or mechanical error, 
and human error or human factors error.  Since the term “technical error” in surgery has a 
different meaning than in industry (a technical error in surgery is in fact a human error), 
the term “mechanical error” is used to represent a situation where equipment 
malfunctioned.  Since the most common errors evaluated were thought to be 
manifestations of human error (as described in most of the publications previously cited), 
and the focus of this research is on training humans, there was no further attempt to sub-
classify organizational and mechanical errors.   
Human error, the specific focus of this exploration, is further sub-classified.  This 
classification system began with Reason’s three categories: knowledge-based mistakes, 
rule-based mistakes, and skill-based slips and lapses, using language more familiar to a 
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surgeon.  In considering knowledge-based mistakes, the phrase “incomplete 
understanding of the problem” is used as a non-judgmental descriptor.  For rule-based 
mistakes, “judgment error” was substituted.  In surgery, and in particular in mandated 
reviews of surgical complications, this concept appears to be widely understood and 
accepted.  Skill-based errors (surgery being a discipline heavily dependent on the 
application of very advanced skills) were further subdivided into carelessness/inattention 
to detail (to address the notion of lapse) and technical error—in the surgical sense (to 
address the concept of slip).  The entire list of error types is presented below:   
Types of Medical Errors as Used in This Study 
1. equipment failure (mechanical error) 
  2. health system error (organizational error) 
  3. incomplete understanding of problem 
  4. failure to use established protocol 
  5. carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail 
  6. error in diagnosis 
  7. communication error 
  8. judgment error 
  9. delay error 
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  10. error of omission 
  11. technique error 
Error types are referred throughout this text by the coding numbers used in the computer 
reporting system, which are two digit adaptations of the listed error types, preceded by a 
“2.”  Thus equipment failure is ErrorID 21. 
Finally, to define a link between the error analysis and the current classification of 
core competencies in resident education, the evaluator was asked to identify which of the 
GME core competencies (Medical Knowledge, Patient Care, Communication, 
Professionalism, Practice Based Learning and Improvement, Systems Based Practice) 
were involved in the error/complication process. 
This analysis of error taxonomy was reviewed with 6 senior academic surgeons at 
the University of South Florida and was modified based on their input.  The total number 
of years of academic surgical experience among the group of individuals was in excess of 
150.  Although all are currently members of the faculty at a single university (University 
of South Florida), their individual origin and experience is from a large number of 
different universities with significantly different backgrounds.  The extensive and diverse 
background of these individuals provided a broadly based initial draft classification.  In 
order to enhance the preliminary “face validity” of the classification system, more 
extensive evaluation was achieved by means of a formal presentation of this classification 
system and the subsequent scoring template to the combined surgical faculty and 
residents at surgical grand rounds.  Feedback from the aggregate department membership 
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was incorporated into the classification and the scoring template.  Iterative changes were 
made in the template to enhance clarity, incorporating recommendations of the surgical 
faculty until the document reflected the collective understanding of the surgical faculty 
regarding error in surgery.  Input of the residents was critical in improving the “user-
friendliness” of the actual instrument used in the planned weekly complication 
assessment process. 
This preliminary classification list was sent externally to 8 individuals who were 
selected on the basis of being nationally recognized academic surgical educators who had 
published in the field of patient safety, as obtained by doing a literature search of the 
National Library of Medicine.  These individuals were each asked (Appendix 1) to 
respond anonymously, defining which of the items on the list were characteristics of 
medical error in surgery.  They were also given the opportunity to provide additional 
error types to the list.   A second request was sent to all 8 individuals to enhance return.  
A total of 4 individuals responded.  There was uniform agreement with the classification 
system and comments of strong support from the respondents. 
3.2 The Scoring Template  
 The higher level classification (organizational, mechanical, human) based on the 
published literature on error was combined with the broader error list, verified by the 
initial survey of surgical safety experts into a single scoring template, which would be 
used as the survey instrument throughout the remainder of the study.  This template was 
reviewed with two experts in measurement (JK, College of Education; SN, College of 
Nursing) as non-surgical experts to assure that the document was easily understandable 
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without need for “insider information.”   These “experts” provided critical insight into the 
need for and methods of establishing reliability and validity. 
 The final template (Appendix 2) included the following fields, each of which was 
described in both a glossary of terms (Appendix 3) and the instructions (Appendix 4): 
A. Patient ID—an open field to allow a numerical sequence of cases, for example 
1,2,3,4,5 at a presentation conference to affirm the order of the cases or the case 
scenario (A,B,C) during validation.  Any inadvertent actual identification other 
than an ordinal was removed upon receipt. 
B. Reviewer—an open field where a reviewer could place initials when paired 
comparisons were being performed.  Otherwise, anything in this field was deleted. 
C. Score—an interval scale for scoring the severity of complication into five 
levels 
  5 = The patient died during this episode of care 
  4 = The patient recovered but with a significant permanent disability 
  3 = The patient recovered but with a significant temporary disability 
2 = The patient recovered without disability but with prolongation of 
hospitalization 
1 = The patient had a “complication” but without any impact on the 
patient’s outcome. 
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D. Complication description—3 -5 word, open text “key words” describing the 
complication 
E.  Medical Error—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the reviewer 
believed an error had occurred  
F. Evaluation—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether an error occurred 
during patient evaluation  
G. Execution—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether an error occurred 
during patient treatment 
H. Slip—a  binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the error was caused by 
doing the appropriate thing but not doing it correctly. 
I. Mistake—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the error was caused by 
doing something inappropriate (This field did not distinguish two subtypes—rule-
based mistake and cognitive-mistake—as it was thought unlikely that academic 
surgeons would be able to consistently make this differentiation). 
J. Types of Error—a classification list of the types of errors (see above) obtained 
from the preliminary validation phase of the study. The classification recognized 
the previously published division of types of error into organizational, technical, 
and human factor.  Because these terms can have ambiguous meaning in clinical 
surgery, they were renamed “equipment failure (mechanical error), health system 
error (organizational error), and a comprehensive list of subcategories of human 
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factor error to represent various categories of human factor error.   Additional 
open spaces were included to allow individuals to add free text. 
K. ACGME Core Competency—a listing of the six ACGME core competencies to 
determine which competency seemed to be associated with the error.  The actual 
wording of the competencies was altered slightly from the ACGME format for 
simplicity 
  1. Delivery of Patient Care 
  2. Insufficient or Inaccurate Medical Knowledge 
  3. Adult Learning; Problem Solving 
  4. Interpersonal and Communication Skills 
  5. Professional Behavior 
  6. Knowing the Healthcare System 
  To assure consistency in understanding/interpretation, a glossary defining the 
terms used in the scoring template and instructions was prepared.  Where possible, 
definitions were taken from the published literature (Appendix 3).  Evaluators were sent a 
detailed instruction sheet. (Appendix4).  The instruction sheet was produced to guide 
individuals in the completion of the scoring template. 
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3.3 Validation 
3.3.1 External Validation.   To further validate the instrument, three surgical scenarios 
were created.  (Appendices 5, 6, 7)  Each scenario included sufficient .information for an 
expert to be able to understand the clinical case and its implications, and sufficient 
information to be able to provide an opinion on the nature of the types of error which had 
occurred.  The three scenarios, the scoring template that resulted from the previously 
described validation, the detailed glossary of terms, and detailed instructions for 
completing the template were sent to a total of 165 individuals (15 each from USF and 
from 10 other academic institutions).  The individuals and institutions were selected from 
the current roster of members of the Association of Academic Surgeons, a large 
membership organization of academic surgeons of all academic ranks throughout the 
United States.  First, all institutions which had at least 15 members of the Association of 
Academic Surgeons were identified from the current organization membership list, sorted 
by state and by institution.  Ten institutions from this list, with at least 15 members each, 
were selected in order to provide geographic distribution across the United States without 
obvious redundancy.  Within each institution selected, a random selection of 15 
individuals was made, using a random number table for selection.  15 individuals from 
the University of South Florida, all academic surgeons, were included as an internal 
control, since these individuals had been exposed to the process, had attended a 
presentation of the methodology, and had participated in discussions regarding the use of 
the template.  This subgroup thus had greater “training” than the remaining 150 academic 
surgeons.   
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The entire packet was submitted to each individual by direct mail.  Return 
envelopes were included with an identification of the institution, but not the individual, 
on the envelope, to identify institutional origin but retain anonymity.  This was carefully 
explained in the instructions.  A number of packets were returned as non-deliverable 
indicating that the individual had moved to another university or had left academic 
surgery.  Other packets were forwarded to the individual who had moved, and these were 
identified with the initial institution to which the packet was sent, as the individual had 
had documented experience at that institution in the recent past (forwarding was 
determined by the US Post Office and this maintained the anonymity of the respondents). 
Data from the external validation were entered into an Excel spreadsheet by a 
member of the staff to assure that any identifying information that might have been 
included was removed. All data were entered in coded format.   Data entry was reverified 
to assure accuracy.  
3.3.2 Internal Validation.  The author and one senior surgical colleague attended 
Morbidity and Mortality Conference at the University of South Florida (USF) over a 
fifteen month period and simultaneously scored the cases which were presented by senior 
residents and discussed by the surgical faculty.  The first three months of reviews were 
used as a “training period” and the two reviewers compared their observations and 
discussed differences in interpretation.  Following the training period, data were collected 
over the subsequent 12 months.  Cases were included if both reviewers attended the same 
conference and submitted a completed template after listening to the case presentation 
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and discussion.  72 cases were analyzed by both reviewers.  The results of the templates 
for these cases were compared. 
3.4 Case Review Methodology and Data Collection 
The scoring template, used in paper format for the validation studies, was 
converted to an identical electronic format and combined with the mandatory weekly 
complication report of the USF Department of Surgery.  Each week all residents assigned 
with senior responsibility routinely completed a complication report electronically, in 
which all surgical procedures performed are listed, together with all complications and 
deaths.  In addition, with approval of the Chairman of the Department and the Program 
Director of the Surgical Residency, the residents are required to complete the error report 
as a component of the weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report.  The data relating to the 
error reporting template are “stripped” electronically from the submitted report and 
automatically transferred without patient identification into a separate electronic 
database.  No Personal Health Information is included in the error report, assuring the 
protection of the patients forming the basis of the report. The identity of the reporting 
resident is also not included in the error data report, assuring the anonymity of the 
resident.  This database is made available to the investigator only after any and all 
identifying information had been electronically removed and responses coded into digital 
format.  The Morbidity and Mortality report provides the data to create the monthly tally 
of the total number of surgical procedures performed and the total number of 
complications reported. No patient identification or personal health information is 
transmitted to the investigator either by the electronic data transfer or the departmental 
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reports.  Although a subset of the cases included in this study are discussed at the 
Department of Surgery weekly Morbidity and Morality Conference, information from the 
conference is not used in this study except in the isolated circumstance of the direct 
comparison of the analysis of outcomes for internal validation using the templates of two 
specific faculty, collected over 12 months. Both faculty members have a legitimate 
reason to participate in the conference, independent of this study.  No patient specific 
information, identified information, or protected information is collected or analyzed at 
any point in the study. 
3.5 Near-Miss Reporting   
Based on the review of the literature, for every complication or adverse event 
there should be a multiple of near-miss events (latent errors).  In order to capture and 
track the number and types of near-miss events, an anonymous, password protected, web-
based data collection system for house staff (residents) to report near-misses was 
instituted. The near-miss report addressed all clinical services, not just surgery, and all 
participating institutions.  The primary purpose of the near-miss reporting system was to 
provide anonymous reports back to the respective institutions to inform their quality 
improvement processes.   The web page was integrated into the house staff duty hours 
documentation package used by the GME program, which was very familiar with all 
residents.  Residents were instructed about the availability of the near-miss reporting 
system at orientation.  The House Staff Association was advised of the near-miss 
reporting system on three separate occasions and asked to encourage use by the residents.  
Each resident received three separate e-mails advising them of the availability of the 
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near-miss reporting system.  All program directors were advised of the availability of the 
near-miss reporting system both by e-mail and at the annual program directors’ 
workshop/retreat. Unfortunately, the number of near-misses actually reported was very 
small.  Although the information was provided to the hospital leadership, it was not used 
in this study.  Identifying the reasons for the poor response would be informative, but it is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
3.6 Preliminary (Formative) Data Review 
After three months of Morbidity and Mortality reporting data had been collected, 
a preliminary analysis of the data was performed to determine the most frequent types of 
errors.  The largest number of errors was in the error classification of “technique error.”  
Since preventing and correcting these errors form the “substance” of a surgical residency 
and are known to require a long time of intensive training (the surgical residency 
program, accredited by the ACGME, requires sixty months of structured, formal 
training), “technique error” was not considered for the focused and time-limited 
simulation training used in this investigation.  The next three most frequent causes of 
error were selected as the basis of a limited training program: judgment error, 
carelessness/inattention to detail, and incomplete understanding of the problem. 
3.7 Designing the Training Program 
The American College of Surgeons (ACS) provided invaluable assistance in the 
development of the training program in the form of participation by the investigator in 
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two formal committees: the Professionalism Committee and the Allied Health 
Professions Patient Safety Subcommittee.   
The investigator served on the Professionalism Committee for two years and 
learned how to identify, plan, and develop video-based training tools for training 
surgeons in the area of “Professionalism.”  During this training, the investigator worked 
with a group of nationally recognized surgical experts in identifying the components of 
Professionalism, writing scripts for vignettes for each of the identified components of 
Professionalism, developing the scenes, performing the taping and editing, and doing a 
post-development analysis of the principles and concepts which had been addressed.  
This experience formed the background for the “Taped Scenario” component of the 
training program which was developed for this study. In addition, the Professionalism 
Committee reviewed the scripts developed for the video component of the training. 
The investigator chaired the Allied Health Professions Patient Safety 
Subcommittee.  This subcommittee includes individuals from a variety of healthcare 
disciplines which all participate in the care of surgical patients: surgeons, an 
anesthesiologist, nurse practitioners, a physician assistant, an operating room nurse 
manager, surgical educators, and surgical simulation experts.  This committee 
participated in a series of conference calls which defined and amplified a short-term goal 
and a long-term goal for the American College of Surgeons. With the approval of the 
leadership of the ACS, the short term goal was to assist in the basic design of a 
simulation-based training program which could serve as the prototype for the 
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investigator’s independent work.  The long-term goal was the development of a CD 
which would include a number of video scenarios to be used in physician training. 
The Subcommittee identified four clinical sites for simulation (operating room, 
recovery room, emergency room, and intensive care unit).  The Subcommittee also 
accepted using the three types of error determined in the preliminary phase of this 
investigation as the focus of the four vignettes (judgment, incomplete understanding of 
the problem, carelessness/inattention to detail).  The group then met at the American 
College of Surgeons headquarters in Chicago and outlined potential scenarios for the four 
clinical sites.  Equal effort was invested in developing each of the four scenarios and 
included identifying possible errors, defining the individuals who should be included in 
the vignette, and addressing how each of the errors could be accomplished in a 
videotaped vignette so as to be easily understood, unambiguous, and of educational 
value. 
3.7.1 Developing the Videotaped Scenarios.   An initial script, based on error in the 
operating room (Appendices 8, 9,10), was created by the investigator and further 
developed and edited by the Patient Safety Subcommittee.  The script was iteratively 
circulated to the subcommittee by e-mail for suggestions and comment.  The final script 
was presented to the Professionalism Committee of the ACS for input and comment.  The 
Professionalism Committee was asked as expert individuals to anonymously “grade” the 
final script based on the likelihood that it would be an effective training tool on a scale of 
1-10. 
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The finalized operating room scenario script was used to produce the videotape, 
utilizing resources available to the investigator through the College of Medicine, and 
utilizing faculty and students from the Department of Theater in the College of Visual 
and Performing Arts at USF.  The scripts were reviewed by two senior faculty members 
in the Department of Theater and minor, non-substantive changes were made to enhance 
the dramatic quality, based on the expertise of the faculty members. All videos were 
taped on the same day and edited.  The final videotape was presented to the Patient 
Safety Subcommittee for input and comment.  The subcommittee voted unanimously that 
the videotape accurately and clearly described the three selected types of error and would 
be effective as a training device. 
3.7.2 Developing the Mannequin-Based Simulation Training.   In addition to the 
video, described above, the training module was designed to include an interactive, live 
training session using a programmed physiological mannequin (“Stan”- Appendix 11).  
The recovery room (Post Anesthesia Care Unit-PACU) scenario (Appendix 12) 
developed in the Patient Safety Subcommittee was used as the background material for 
the development of this simulation-based training module.  To increase the validity of the 
simulation, a series of meetings was held which included the investigator, a professor of 
Industrial Organizational Psychology, Michael Brannick PhD, and two psychology 
doctoral students, for the purpose of planning the training session.  Professor Brannick 
had previously published books and articles on the subject of training and is considered 
an expert in the field.  The plan was to create a doctoral research project in psychology 
which would be “nested” within the training session.  The collaboration in development 
and validation of the training session was a critically important component of this work.  
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For the purposes of this study, however, the actual analysis of the performance of the 
residents, the debriefing, and the pre-test/post-test form the basis of a separate doctoral 
project , are not included as a component of this study, and do not appear in this 
manuscript. 
The USF Simulation Center agreed to assist in the development and 
implementation of the resident training session and approved the use of the simulation 
center (Center for Advanced Clinical Learning) for the actual sessions.  The Center also 
provided both staff and expertise in the development and implementation of the 
simulation-based training.  In a preliminary meeting with the director of the Center and 
her staff, the content of the simulation training session was reviewed, an extensive review 
of possible responses was codified, needed supplies were identified, a script was 
developed (Appendix 12) and the mannequin was programmed to produce appropriate 
physiological responses to the interventions anticipated to be requested by the trainees.  
The 34 available surgical residents were scheduled randomly for one of two selected days 
for training.  Residents were scheduled to arrive at 15 minute intervals to avoid 
individuals meeting and discussing the session.  Each resident was allocated one hour for 
the training.  Three residents did not present for their assigned training session and were 
rescheduled for the subsequent session.  Each resident was scheduled to participate in 
four fifteen minute segments: 1. the introduction, informed consent, and pre-test; 2. 
watching the video (12 minutes); 3. performing the simulation-based training (15 
minutes); 4. debriefing by a senior surgical faculty member (15 minutes).   Six weeks 
after the training session, the residents were asked to complete the open-ended test a 
second time. 
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3.8 Institutional Review 
Consultation with the legal advisor to the University of South Florida Institutional 
Review Board established that the data collection process was an extension of the 
existing Morbidity and Mortality review process and not a new collection of research 
data, in that it was a refinement of an ongoing process rather than collection of new 
information.  In addition, all data were de-identified before transfer within the server.  
However, it was clear that the training session for the residents involved a protected class 
of subjects, and that any information obtained from the training session would qualify as 
“generalizable research.”  Accordingly, the study, including the training module and the 
associated evaluations, was submitted to the USF IRB and approved. 
3.9 Data Analysis and Statistics  
Results of surveys and templates were accumulated electronically in an Oracle 
database and downloaded to an Excel spreadsheet for review and analysis.  Summary 
statistics were determined and multivariate comparisons were performed.  Data are 
expressed as mean , median, quantiles, standard deviation, and SEM. Commercial 
statistical packages (MiniTab, SPSS, SAS, True Epistat) were used as appropriate to 
perform Fisher’s Exact tests of frequency data, Kolmogorov Smirnov tests of normality 
and of distribution comparison, linear regression, trend line analysis, and ANOVA.  
Parametric statistical tests were employed only when normality testing affirmed no 
significant difference from a normal distribution and examination of subsequent residuals 
demonstrated the reasonableness of the assumption of normality.  Conditional probability 
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for individual analyses was determined by measuring the actual frequency of events in a 
subgroup as a percentage of the overall frequency of group events.   
3.9.1 Reliability Analysis.  Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any 
measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated trials.  Although many studies 
utilize Cronbach’s alpha or the kappa statistic to assess reliability, was selected.  This is 
the sum of agreement (true positive plus true negative) divided by the total number in the 
subgroup at risk.  They describe this as not being subject to bias and suggest a critical 
value greater than 0.7 to confer “reliability” on classification/taxonomy systems. In this 
study, reliability was assessed between two experts who “scored” a series of actual case 
presentations, among respondents to the set of three standard scenarios, and between 
aggregate data from the individual scenarios. 
3.9.2 Validity Assessment. Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately 
reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to measure.  
External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study are generalizable or 
transferable.  Internal validity refers to (1) the rigor with which the study was conducted 
(e.g., the study's design, the care taken to conduct measurements, and decisions 
concerning what was and wasn't measured) and (2) the extent to which the designers of a 
study have taken into account alternative explanations for any causal relationships they 
explore.   
3.9.2.1 Face Validity.  Face validity is concerned with how a measure or 
procedure appears. Does it seem like a reasonable way to gain the information the 
researchers are attempting to obtain? Does it seem well designed? Does it seem as though 
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it will work reliably?  Face validity was ascertained by demonstrating the instruments and 
materials to designated groups of content experts.  For the template, the group of experts 
was the faculty of the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida.  For the 
video, the groups of experts were the Patient Safety Subcommittee of the American 
College of Surgeons, the Professionalism Taskforce of the American College of 
Surgeons, and the faculty of the Department of Theater at the University of South 
Florida.  For the simulation, the groups were the Patient Safety Subcommittee of the 
American College of Surgeons, and the faculty and graduate students of the Division of 
Industrial Organizational Psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University 
of South Florida, and the professional simulation staff of the Office of Curriculum and 
Medical Education at the University of South Florida. 
3.9.2.2 Construct Validity. Construct validity seeks agreement between a 
theoretical concept and a specific measuring device or procedure.  Construct validity of 
the template was assessed by comparing the scores of the expert surgeons evaluating the 
scenarios by survey with the planned scores of the design scenarios. 
3.9.2.3 Criterion Validity.  Criterion related validity, also referred to as 
instrumental validity, is used to demonstrate the accuracy of a measure or procedure by 
comparing it with another measure or procedure which has been demonstrated to be 
valid. Criterion validity for the types of error was assessed by comparing the scores in 
individual components of the analysis for the individual type of error with the previously 
accepted classification of error in the categories of evaluation versus execution, slip, and 
mistake as defined previously.  The types of errors identified throughout the study period 
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consistently related to the published characteristics of errors, that is, whether they 
occurred during evaluation or execution, and whether they were a slip or a mistake. 
3.9.2.4. Content Validity.  Content validity is based on the extent to which a 
measurement reflects the specific intended domain of content.  The classification system 
used throughout this study is based on the prevalent taxonomies published over the past 
25 years and is modified only to use language and concepts that are more familiar to 
surgeons.  Errors are classified into organizational/systemic, technical/mechanical, and 
human factors categories, as is now widely accepted.  Since neither the communication 
with local and national experts nor the pilot data collection suggested that there would be 
a large component of organizational or mechanical errors, these components were not 
further divided into subcategories.  Anticipating that human factors errors would 
represent the dominant class of errors, and planning to use human factors errors in the 
training program for surgeons, human factors error was subdivided into 9 categories, 
reflecting the published literature in the field. 
3.9.3 Data Classification Analysis.   Responses to scoring templates were analyzed in 3 
ways: overall descriptive analysis of all data; by grouping of four error types into a single 
category (carelessness/inattention to detail, judgment, incomplete understanding, and 
technical error) to estimate the previously described categories of slips and mistakes; by 
grouping of three error types into a single category (carelessness/inattention to detail, 
judgment, incomplete understanding) to estimate the three categories that were 
specifically designed into the training instrument.  In other words, data were structured 
and analyzed to facilitate the comparison of data after training to baseline data, and to 
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specifically address  1. overall change (all error categories), 2. slips and mistakes, 
represented by the four categories listed, 3. areas of specific training, represented by the 
three categories.  
Regressions were performed to analyze whether number of procedures, number or 
percent complications, percent complications associated with error, or percent 
complications associated with index errors changed during the 12 month baseline period.  
Normality of the data was affirmed by analysis of residuals.   Regressions and ANOVA 
were performed using MiniTab or SAS.  Individual distributions were assessed for 
normality by visually examining graphs of residuals and by Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
testing.  In addition to traditional statistical hypothesis testing, pre- and post-training data 
were compared by ANOVA of linear regression.  For purposes of hypothesis testing, the 
null hypothesis was rejected if p<0.05 unless otherwise specified. 
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4. Results 
 
The original prototype of the scoring template of medical errors was created based 
on a thorough review of the published literature on industrial error, medical error, and 
surgical complications.  The prototype was refined utilizing the input of internal 
academic surgical colleagues and tested at the surgical Morbidity and Mortality 
Conference.  The list of medical errors was sent to eight external academic surgical 
experts qualified by having published peer reviewed articles on the subject of patient 
safety.  Four experts responded to the request (50%) after two mailings.  All experts 
agreed with the classification system.   
The case scenarios were reviewed with members of the surgical faculty, to verify 
that they were realistic and that the medical error appeared to be clear and scorable using 
the template.  Adjustments were made to facilitate comprehension and ease of use.  The 
template was also reviewed by two nationally recognized experts (S.M., College of 
Nursing; J.K., College of Education) in measurement and evaluation to verify that the 
instrument itself was understandable, consistent, and likely to be usable for external 
validation. 
 One hundred sixty-five scenarios and templates were sent out as described to 
selected members of the Association of Academic Surgeons.  A second mailing to each 
individual, thanking him/her if he had completed the survey and reminding him/her if not 
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yet completed, was sent 6 weeks after the first mailing..  After two mailings, 48 
completed evaluations were returned completed (29% response rate).   
4.1 External Template Validation 
Forty-eight completed evaluations were available for analysis.  The average age 
of the respondents was 15.9 +/- 9.2 years post surgical residency.  All respondents had 
current faculty appointments in a major university and were actively involved in 
academic surgery (Table 2). 
Table 2. Years Since Completing Residency 
Years Since 
Residency N 
In Residency 3 
0-5 2 
6-10 9 
11-15 10 
16-20 7 
21-25 8 
26-30 4 
31-35 4 
36-40  0 
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As designed, each of the three scenarios was intended to demonstrate a specific 
type of error:  Scenario 1, technical error (31) and judgment (28); Scenario 2, 
carelessness/inattention to detail (25); and Scenario 3, judgment (28).   In addition, each 
describes a different severity of injury and contains a differing level of complexity.  
Scenario 1 is straightforward with minimal impact on the patient.  Scenario 2 is 
complicated (multiple components but a prudent individual will identify them correctly) 
and would result temporary harm to the patient.  Scenario 3 is complex (multiple 
components which could be analyzed in several ways) and would lead to serious harm to 
the patient.  The Outcome Scores for the three scenarios are summarized in Table 3.   
 
Table 3.  Outcome Score for the Three Scenarios   
Patient outcome reported by surgeon experts for three clinical scenarios.   
 
    
Scenario  
1   
Scenario 
2   
Scenario 
3   
Outcome Definition 
Outcome 
ID # % # % # % 
No injury or delay 1 15 34.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 
No injury but increased 
length of Stay (LOS) 2 23 52.3 8 16.0 0 0.0 
Injury with temporary 
disability 3 6 13.6 39 78.0 19 44.2 
Injury with permanent 
disability 4 0 0.0 2 4.0 24 55.8 
Death 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
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If the sum of Outcome Scores 3+4+5 is considered to represent serious adverse 
outcomes (National Association of Insurance Adjustors criteria),  then 14% of responders 
scored Scenario 1 as having a serious adverse outcome, 82% scored Scenario 2 as having 
a serious adverse outcome, and 100% scored Scenario 3 as leading to a serious adverse 
outcome.  This confirms the ability of the scoring system to distinguish the severity of the 
error.  This is particularly noteworthy since none of the patients died in the scenarios, 
eliminating “death” as an outcome score.  The weighted score for Scenario 1 is 1.8, 
Scenario 2, 2.9, and Scenario 3, 3.6.  This estimate of the impact of the events in the 
scenario on patient outcome seems to be appropriate in that the patient in Scenario 1 
might have slight prolongation in length of stay (outcome score less than 2); the patient in 
Scenario 2 would have some disability which might be temporary (outcome score 
approximately 3); and the patient in Scenario 3 would be expected to have a very 
prolonged hospitalization with multiple complications, probably requiring subsequent 
surgical procedures (outcome score near 4).  The scoring template appears to capture the 
impact of the error on patient outcome realistically.  Listed in Table 4 is the summary 
information on error occurrence for the three scenarios. 
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Table 4. Agreement in Error Classification in the Scenarios 
  
Weighted 
Score % Error % Eval %Exec Both Slip Mistake 
Wt. % 
Impact 
           
Scenario 1 1.8 77% 8.1% 92.0% 0.0% 93.5% 6.5% 65.8% 
Scenario 2 2.9 98% 2.2% 93.3% 4.4% 41.2% 58.8% 83.9% 
Scenario 3 3.6 79% 50.0% 44.1% 5.9% 42.9% 57.1% 58.0% 
 
 By design, each of the scenarios represented an error.  In the experience of the 
author, many surgeons interpret a surgical consequence that is difficult to avoid to be 
“unavoidable” and thus perhaps not due to error.  An injury to the intestine during an 
operation is a case in point.  While it is an error, in the sense that it is an unintended 
consequence which could have been avoided, in scenario 1 approximately 25% of 
surgeons did not identify the intestinal injury as an error.  Similarly, 21% of surgeons did 
not identify an error in Scenario 3, while fully 98% identified an error in Scenario 2.  
Scenario 1 and scenario 2 represent strictly technical “failures”  and as would be 
expected, greater than 90% of responders identified an error occurring during execution.  
Scenario 3 was identified by half of surgeons as an error during evaluation and half as an 
error during execution.  This very complex case contains elements of both types of error.  
The template fails to be able to resolve this dilemma in the simple binary choice of 
evaluation or execution.  This complexity is more readily apparent in the more detail 
analysis of specific error types presented and discussed later.  In Scenario 1, the surgeons 
uniformly identified the error as a slip (the correct action done incorrectly).  In Scenarios 
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2 and 3 there was an almost even assignment to slip and mistake, even when the error 
was clearly identified as occurring during execution as in Scenario 2.  
The more detailed analysis of the types of error provided by the broader error 
classification scheme in the template is demonstrated in Table 5 and graphically depicted 
in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.  Error Types Identified in Scenarios   
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The bars indicate the frequency that specific errors were identified for each of the three 
validation scenarios. 
 
Table 5.  Characterization of Error Types in Validation Scenarios   
For each scenario, the percentage of expert responses identifying the primary source of 
error. 
 
Error Types  Error ID Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Equipment/Mechanical 21 0% 0% 0% 
Organizational error 22 0% 0% 0% 
Incomplete understanding 
23 13% 0% 15% 
Failure to use protocol 24 5% 0% 0% 
Carelessness/inattention to 
detail 25 13% 67% 0% 
Error in diagnosis 26 0% 0% 3% 
Communication error 27 0% 0% 0% 
Judgment error 28 3% 2% 46% 
Delay error 29 0% 0% 0% 
Error of omission 30 0% 0% 0% 
Technique error 31 66% 31% 36% 
 
This table only includes the primary error identified for each scenario.  The 
numbers in bold identify the major errors identified by the surgeons for each scenario.  
For Scenario 1, most responders felt that this was a technical problem, although 
approximately 25% identified the error as either incomplete understanding or 
carelessness/inattention to detail.  In Scenario 2, 67% identified the error as 
carelessness/inattention to detail, although almost one third saw this as an error in 
technique.  Similarly, in Scenario 3, almost 50% recognized a judgment error, yet a third 
felt that this was a technique error.  This information for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 
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provides a better description of the error than the simple classification into slip or 
mistake, which would appear to be “confounding” the combination of more than one 
error. 
 
Table 6.  Characterization of All Errors Listed in Validation Scenarios  
For each scenario, the distribution of all errors reported by experts. 
 
Error Description 
Error 
ID Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Equipment/Mechanical 21 0% 2% 0% 
Organizational error 22 0% 0% 0% 
Incomplete understanding 23 10% 6% 18% 
Failure to use protocol 24 7% 5% 2% 
Carelessness/inattention 
to detail 25 27% 39% 8% 
Error in diagnosis 26 0% 1% 16% 
Communication error 27 0% 1% 0% 
Judgment error 28 11% 10% 30% 
Delay error 29 0% 3% 0% 
Error of omission 30 0% 3% 0% 
Technique error 31 45% 30% 26% 
 
 
Table 6 includes all errors identified by the surgeons for each of the three 
scenarios.  In this analysis, there is no attempt to reconcile the order of the errors (which 
will be addressed below).  Although technique is identified by 46% in scenario 1, this is 
less than when only the primary error is considered, thus allowing a greater appreciation 
of the cognitive or planning error that was designed into the scenario.  Scenario 2 is 
actually made more confusing by considering all listed errors without weighting, 
decreasing the “carelessness/inattention to detail” from 66% to 39% and introducing a 
variety of additional errors (equipment/mechanical, incomplete understanding, failure to 
use protocol, error in diagnosis, communication error, judgment error, delay error, and  
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error omission).  This would not appear to be helpful.  Scenario 3, an even more 
complicated clinical situation, is similarly more diffuse when all errors are considered.  
When the data are combined into a tabular form and apply weighting for the location of 
the error types in the individual surgeon’s list (Table 7), the major error is more clearly 
accentuated and yet the associated error types are also clear. 
Table 7.  Scenario Data Analysis Weighted by Position in List 
 
Case 1 List E21 E22 E23 E24 E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31 
Weight = 1 5th  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weight = 2 4th  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Weight = 3 3rd  0 0 0 1 4 0 0 4 0 0 2
Weight = 4 2nd  0 0 2 2 12 0 0 4 0 0 3
Weight = 5 1st  0 0 4 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 27
Sum  0 0 6 5 21 0 0 8 0 0 33
Weighted 
sum  0 0 28 21 85 0 0 28 0 0 155
Weighted 
ave   0 0 1.87 1.40 5.67 0.00 0.00 1.87 0.00 0.00 10.3
             
Case 2   E21 E22 E23 E24 E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31 
Weight = 1 5th  0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weight = 2 4th  1 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1
Weight = 3 3rd  0 0 1 2 2 1 1 6 2 2 3
Weight = 4 2nd  0 0 1 3 12 0 0 3 2 0 13
Weight = 5 1st  0 0 0 1 28 1 0 1 0 0 16
Sum  1 0 7 7 42 2 1 12 4 3 33
Weighted 
sum  2 0 15 24 194 8 3 39 14 8 143
Weighted 
ave   0.13 0.00 1.00 1.60 12.9 0.53 0.20 2.60 0.93 0.53 9.53
             
Case 3   E21 E22 E23 E24 E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31 
Weight = 1 5th  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weight = 2 4th  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
Weight = 3 3rd  0 0 3 0 4 2 0 5 0 0 3
Weight = 4 2nd  0 0 7 1 3 11 0 2 0 0 5
eight = 5 1st  0 0 5 0 0 2 0 19 0 0 14
Sum  0 0 15 2 8 16 0 26 0 0 24
Weighted 
sum  0 0 62 6 25 62 0 118 0 0 103
Weighted 
ave   0 0 4.1 0.4 1.7 4.1 0 7.9 0 0 6.9
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Scenario 1 is clearly identified as  technical error, yet carelessness /inattention to detail 
(and to a lesser extent incomplete understanding of the problem and judgment error) are 
also recognized.  Scenario 2 is recognized as principally carelessness/inattention to detail 
and a technical error.  Scenario 3 is a judgment error and a technical error, but also 
identified is the fact that there is perhaps an error in diagnosis.  Although the total 
number of respondents is relatively small (N=45), the analysis of the data would suggest 
that the classification system can provide both a valid and a rich understanding of the 
errors. 
Twelve completed scenarios were submitted by faculty and residents at the 
investigator’s institution (University of South Florida) and were also analyzed 
independently to determine if reliability and validity within the study institution was 
greater than of the sample as a whole.  Since the individuals within the investigator’s 
institution had the greatest familiarity with the instrument, it might be anticipated that this 
group would more consistently use the scoring template to evaluate error (reliability and 
validity).  The average number of years since residency for this group (8.1 +/- 2.0 years) 
is significantly less than for the other respondents (15.9 +/- 1.3 years) or the total group 
(18.3 +/- 1.4 years).  p<0.05 for both comparisons.   This is in part due to the inclusion of 
3 residents in this group (there were no residents from any other institution), yet the 
difference is still significant (P=0.05) if the residents are excluded.  The analysis of this 
subgroup, which is perhaps more indicative of the group that participated in the actual 
patient error reporting (to be reported below), is considerably more homogeneous than 
the larger group as a whole.  For Scenario 1, 82% of respondents identified an error, all 
noted it occurred during execution, as a slip.  For Scenario 2, 100% identified the action 
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as an error during execution, and a slip.  For Scenario 3, 73% identified an error; half 
placed it in evaluation (and all noted a mistake) and half in execution (and all noted a 
slip).  The outcome scores were, respectively, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2 with Scenario 2 slightly but 
not significantly higher than the total group, and Scenario 3 slightly lower than the total 
group but not significantly. 
4.2 Internal Comparison 
Seventy-two patient presentations were scored by each of two senior surgical 
faculty members over a 12 month period.   Cases were selected for presentation in the 
conference by the surgical residency program director independently, without regard to 
the study. Cases were only scored when both faculty were present at the same Mordidity 
and Mortality Conference to evaluate the same case presentation.   This methodology, 
while not random, is unbiased. 
Both evaluators agreed on the presence or absence of error in 59 of the 72 cases 
(reliability = 0.83).   By Fisher’s Exact Test, the probability was 0.41 (NS).  The 
agreement between the two evaluators and the breakdown of outcome scores are 
indicated below in Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8.  Agreement Between the Two Evaluators  
  Evaluator 2 No Evaluator 2 Yes 
Evaluator 1 No 24 9 
Evaluator 1 Yes  3 36 
   Reliability = 0.83 
    Exact-P=.4097 
 
 
Table 9. Internal Evaluator Outcome Scores   
Outcome was scored on a 1-5 scale.                                    
SCORE Description Evaluator 1     Evaluator 2   
1 
No adverse effect on 
outcome 2 0.03  7 0.10
2 
No injury but increased 
length of stay 13 0.18  14 0.19
3 
Injury with temporary 
disability 33 0.46  27 0.38
4 
Injury with permanent 
disability 5 0.07  5 0.07
5 Death 19 0.26  19 0.26
   Weighted score 3.36   Weighted score 3.21 
 Graphically, the outcome scores of the two evaluators demonstrate a high degree of 
agreement (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.   Comparison of Error Scores (1-5) Between Evaluators 1 and 2 
 
The outcome scores of the two evaluators were compared by linear regression and 
ANOVA.  There was a very high agreement between the evaluators: 
Score #2= 0.99970 (Score #1) - 0.1518  ( p<0.0001)   
Correlation analysis demonstrated r= .88 and ANOVA demonstrated an adjusted R-
squared = 0.77.  Analysis of residuals (Figure 3) showed no evidence of non-normality or 
unequal variance.  KS analysis for Evaluator 1 demonstrated mean outcome score = 3.36, 
SD 1.14, median 3, KS=0.069 (p>.15); for Evaluator 2 mean outcome score=3.208, 
SD=1.30, median 3, KS=0.055 (p>.15).  Using the KS test to compare the two 
distributions of scores p>.99.    Scores were also compared by Fleiss Kappa statistic and 
no difference was detected in any of the five outcome score levels.  There does not 
appear to be a significant difference between the scoring processes of the two evaluators. 
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Figure 3.  Residual Analysis of Error and Index Error   
Residuals were calculated for the trend analysis of total error and index error over time 
for the entire study period. 
 
The assessments of the two evaluators were compared as to whether they believed 
the error occurred during evaluation or execution.  Previous studies have separated errors 
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that occurred during evaluation (planning) from those occurring during execution.  This 
generally corresponds to the distinction between mistakes (planning) and slips 
(execution).  The evaluators identified very few cases where error had occurred during 
evaluation (Evaluator 1 in 6, Evaluator 2 in 4) making the analysis of errors during 
evaluation “trivial.”       In those cases where the two evaluators agreed on the presence of 
error (N=36), both evaluators agreed that the error occurred during execution in 27/28 
opportunities but only agreed in 50% that the error occurred during evaluation in the 
remaining cases.  This could have been confounded by the use of the term evaluation 
instead of planning, as the missing cases leading to lack of agreement were usually not 
scored in this category.  Both evaluators therefore consistently agreed on the presence of 
errors of execution and likely agreed similarly on the presence of errors of evaluation/ 
planning. 
The assessment of the two evaluators as to whether the error was a slip or a 
mistake was evaluated in the 36 cases where the evaluators agreed that an error had 
occurred.  The evaluators demonstrated a significant agreement regarding the occurrence 
of a slip versus a mistake.  In 31 cases where the error had occurred during execution, 
Evaluator 1 identified a slip in 25 and Evaluator 2 in 26. The evaluators identified very 
few errors occurring during evaluation. However, of the 6 errors during evaluation which 
were identified by Evaluator 1, one was classed as a mistake and not classified in the 
other 5.  Evaluator 2 identified a mistake in 3 and a slip in 1, in the 4 evaluation errors 
identified. This is not entirely conclusive because in 5 cases neither a slip nor a mistake 
was coded.  These data indicate a high reliability in identifying the presence of a mistake 
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in errors of evaluation and of a slip in errors of execution, demonstrating internal 
consistency in the evaluation template scoring. 
The primary error type for the two evaluators is categorized in Table 10.  
Table 10.   Distribution of Error Types in Inter-rater Comparison 
  Eval 1 Eval 2   
Error ID Frequency Frequency Error Definition 
21 1 1 equipment/mechanical failure 
22 1 0 organizational error 
23 1 9 incomplete understanding 
24 3 2 failure to use protocol 
25 11 8 
carelessness/carelessness/inattention to 
detail 
26 1 1 error in diagnosis 
27 1 3 communication error 
28 2 2 judgment error 
29 1 1 delay error 
30 0 0 error of omission 
31 17 18 technique error 
Graphically, Evaluator 2 was more likely to identify that there was incomplete 
understanding of the problem, whereas Evaluator 1 was more likely to identify 
carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail.  
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Figure 4.  Graphical Comparison of Errors Identified by Internal Raters 
 
The evaluators agreed on the exact primary error type in 64% or 23/36 cases 
(Figure 4).  The agreement was very high when all error types listed for a case were 
compared between the two investigators,  specifically identifying the likelihood that the 
first error type was one of the four types which corresponded with the previously 
described categories of slip and mistake (Error ID 23,25,28,31).  The evaluators agreed in 
92% or 33/36 cases in which an error had occurred that the primary error was one of 
these four.  The specific training was designed to address three of these four, incomplete 
understanding, carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail, and judgment, and was not 
specifically designed to address error in technique.  When the three error types (23,25,28) 
were compared between the two evaluators, there was agreement in 72%. 
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4.3 Video Evaluation 
4.3.1 Video Script Review.  Thirteen nationally recognized medical educators, all 
members of the Professionalism Task Force of the American College of Surgeons, 
reviewed the script and responded to the question “How likely is this process to be an 
effective means of training residents in the area of medical error?”  They were instructed 
to write down (anonymous) a score from 1-10.  The average score was 8.5 (p<0.05) with 
a standard error of the mean of 0.26 (95% confidence interval 7.9-9.0) 
4.3.2 Video Review.  The completed video was demonstrated to the Committee on Allied 
Health Professionals of the American College of Surgeons at the Annual Clinical 
Congress of the American College of Surgeons.  Ten nationally respected academic 
surgeons and two non-physician surgical educators participated.  The members were 
asked to provide feedback and criticism.  The committee voted unanimously to endorse 
the video as a valid training instrument, with a high likelihood of being effective in 
training surgical residents in the area of medical error. 
4.4 Analysis of Baseline Error Data 
For 3 months, morbidity and mortality templates were reviewed by the 
investigator to assure that the “system” was functioning, the data were being stored in a 
complete and retrievable manner, and that the residents were completing the assessments 
appropriately.  
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After the initial 3 months of preliminary data collection, data were collected 
automatically using the electronic template.  A preliminary analysis of the data to 
determine the most frequent types of error was conducted at the 6-month time point.  
 The monthly error incidence is shown in Figure 5.  The most common type of 
error in the preliminary analysis was technical, followed by judgment error, 
carelessness/inattention to detail, and incomplete understanding.  This preliminary 
analysis was used to determine the material to be developed in the simulation training.  
The analysis was repeated at the conclusion of twelve months and demonstrated the same 
distribution of errors.  
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Figure 5 .   Graph of Number of Errors Per Month During Baseline 
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Over the subsequent 12 months, all reported complications were scored using the 
electronic template.  During the 12 month baseline analysis period, 9830 surgical cases 
were performed and available for analysis.  A total of 332 complications were reported 
(3.4% reported complication rate) and an error was reported to be associated in 79% of 
the reported complications  (Table 11).  These values are consistent with data reported in 
the surgical literature. 
 
 Table 11.  Monthly Procedures, Complications, and Errors During Baseline Period 
 
 
Month 
Procedures 
#
Complications 
#
Errors 
#
Error % 
% 
Nov-05 798 10 9 90.0 
Dec-05 767 42 38 90.5 
Jan-06 927 10 8 80.0 
Feb-06 761 25 21 84.0 
Mar-06 811 26 21 80.8 
Apr-06 748 26 16 61.5 
May-06 929 41 32 78.0 
Jun-06 709 27 22 81.5 
Jul-06 822 20 17 85.0 
Aug-06 902 34 28 82.4 
Sep-06 857 22 18 81.8 
Oct-06 799 26 14 53.8 
Total – 12 month 9830 309 244 79.0 
% Complications  3.1%     
Error Rate per 
Complication  
79.0%     
 
 
The distribution of type of error is shown in Figure 6.  The error was due to a slip 
in 58% and a mistake in 20%.  The most common type of error was “technical error,” 
reported in 63.5% of errors.  Judgment errors were reported in 29.6%, 
carelessness/inattention to detail in 29.3%, and incomplete understanding in 22.7%.  
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Since more than one type of error could be reported, the total is greater than 100%.  This 
breakdown of errors was used for the development of the training program.    
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Figure 6. Frequency Distribution of Error Types During Baseline Period 
The average outcome score was 2.76, and was distributed thus: no adverse effect 
in 3.6%, prolongation of hospitalization but no patient injury in 34.4%, definite but non-
permanent disability in 25.1%, permanent disability in 8.4%, and death in 16.0%.  Using 
a definition for serious error as the sum of 3+4+5 outcome scores yields a serious error 
rate in the baseline period of 49.5%.   The outcome score was not different (Mann-
Whitney test) in the presence or absence of an error.   Patient outcome by month was 
analyzed by linear regression, and there was no significant change in the number of 
complications per month or the percent complications per month.   
Number = 22.5 complications + 0.341/month (p=0.65) 
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 The percentage of complications associated with a reported error decreased over the 
twelve month period. 
Percent Error = 92% -1.5%/month; p= 0.051   
The percentage of cases for which an index error was reported did not change 
significantly over the period. 
% index error= 54% - 0.96%/month; p=.33 
Table 12 demonstrates the conditional probabilities that a specific error type was reported 
given that the error was reported as having occurred during evaluation or execution, and 
given that it was reported as a slip or as a mistake.  Error Types 23, 26, and 28 
(incomplete understanding, error in diagnosis, judgment error) were most likely to have 
been reported as occurring during evaluation.  Error types 25 and 31 
(carelessness/inattention to detail, technique error) were most likely to have been reported 
as occurring during execution. 
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 Table 12.  Analysis of Characteristics of Individual Error Types   
Conditional Probability of Error Type given Error Characteristics (Evaluation versus Execution and  
Slip versus Mistake). 
  
 
Error Type             E21 E22 E23 E24 E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31
Eval & 
Exec Tot Err%    0.05 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.12   0.02 0.00 0.46
N=257        Both 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
  Slip        0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.58
          Mistake 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.18
          Neither 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.35
               
Eval only Tot Err% 0.02 0.04 0.26 0.05 0.07 0.23 0.04 0.23   0.02 0.05
N=57 Both 0.00     0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Slip      0.00 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.00 0.06
  Mistake      0.00 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.05
        
66 Neither 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.06
               
Exec only     Tot Err% 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.01    0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.57 
N=190 Both 0.00        0.17 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
  Slip         0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.64
           Mistake 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.05 0.32
           Neither 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.45
               
Neither           Tot Err% 0.20 0.10 0.70 
N=10         Both     
  Slip           0.25 0.00 0.75
             Mistake 0.00 1.00 0.00
  Neither             0.20 0.00     0.80 
 
4.5 Development and Validation of Training Program 
Initial data evaluation suggested that, after errors in technique, the most common 
types of errors reported were errors of incomplete understanding of the problem, 
judgment, and carelessness/inattention to detail.  In order to maximize the likelihood of 
identifying an effect of training in altering error, these three specific errors were selected 
as the focus of the training program. 
The American College of Surgeons agreed to create a subcommittee, The Patient 
Safety Subcommittee, of the Committee on Allied Health Professionals.  This 
subcommittee met by conference call on three separate occasions of an hour each, and 
conference summaries were submitted to participants to inform the next conference call.  
The Subcommittee then met physically at the American College of Surgeons 
headquarters in Chicago for two days to “brainstorm” the development of the training 
program.  The author chaired both the conference calls and the in-person meeting.  An 
initial draft of the ideas generated was circulated to the members for agreement.  Four 
potential scenarios were developed in the brainstorming process, which included the 3 
index errors (incomplete understanding, judgment, carelessness/inattention to detail), and 
which would be enacted respectively in the operating room, recovery room, emergency 
room, and surgical intensive care unit. 
Two of these, the operating room and the recovery room, were selected for use in 
the simulation-based training session.  The operating room scenario was selected to be 
scripted, acted, and videotaped.  The recovery room scenario was selected to be used in 
the mannequin based, hands on training session.  The script of the operating room 
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scenario was sent to the members of the Patient Safety Committee for editing and 
comments.  After two iterations, the script was reviewed by a senior faculty member in 
the Department of Psychology and by a senior faculty member in the Department of 
Theater. 
The script was distributed at a face to face meeting of the American College of 
Surgeons Professionalism Task Force.  This group was selected because it had already 
created and finalized 14 videotaped scenarios for the purposes of training surgeons and 
surgical residents.  The Committee (14 members) was composed of medical experts in 
the fields of Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, Internal Medicine, and Medical Education.  
Each member was given a copy of the draft script and was asked to comment and to vote 
on a scale of 1-10 on how likely the script would be effective as a training tool.  The 
committee score for the expected efficacy of the video was 8.5 +/- 0.26SEM, with a 
minimum of 7, maximum of 10, and median of 8. 
Preparing the videotape.  The final script was given to two senior faculty 
members in the Department of Theater at the University of South Florida.  They recruited 
an additional faculty member and six senior undergraduate students, who volunteered to 
act in the scenario.  The Tampa VA hospital approved using an empty operating room on 
a Saturday afternoon.   The Media Center of the University of South Florida College of 
Medicine agreed to loan a professional, digital videocamera.  A photographer volunteered 
to operate the camera at the video shoot.  Cue cards were prepared for the various 
components of the scenario.  The scenario consisted of four discrete components 
(Appendix 8), an introduction, an operating room scene which included the three index 
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errors, a roundtable discussion of a moderator and three surgeon actors, and a repeat of 
the operating room scene with the errors corrected.  The Media Center at USF  performed 
editing of the final video.  The videotape was demonstrated to the Committee on Allied 
Health Professionals of the American College of Surgeons at the Annual Clinical 
Congress.  The committee voted unanimously that the video was representative of the 
three index errors and that it was highly likely to be effective as a training tool. 
The Hybrid Simulation Training Session.  The Director of the Center for 
Advanced Clinical Learning at the University of South Florida College of Medicine 
agreed to provide staff assistance and the use of the patient simulation center for the 
training sessions.  The facilities included an examination room prepared as a recovery 
room, a trained nurse practitioner, remote cameras with a camera/audio operator, two 
additional nurses, and two senior surgeons.  Thirty-four residents were each scheduled for 
one hour of training.  A senior faculty member and two doctoral students from the 
Department of Psychology observed the training sessions and administered a survey 
examination to the residents regarding the training session.  Each resident participated in 
four discrete phases: introduction/consent/pre-test; watching the 12 minute video; 
performing the mannequin-based recovery room scenario; and a one-on-one debriefing 
session with one of the two senior surgeons who had remotely observed the training 
session.  Each participating resident repeated the survey test six weeks after the training 
session. 
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4.6 Post-Training Data Analysis 
 
Post-training data were collected over a 6-month period in an identical manner as 
in the pre-training period.  Data are depicted in 6-month blocks to facilitate comparison 
(Table 13).  The first 2 periods are also combined as the pre-training period.  Comparison 
between the 6 months immediately preceding training to the 6 months following training 
was used to have more equal population sizes, and the comparison was made using 
Fisher’s Exact Test.   
Data were also analyzed by regression analysis over the entire 18 month time 
period (based on the null hypothesis that there was no effect of the training).  There was 
no difference between number of patients treated per month before and after training, 
either by Fisher’s Exact test or by regression (P=.35).   
Data are presented by month for the entire 18 month study period in Table 14.  
The table demonstrates procedures, complications, % complications, error, errors as 
percent of complications, errors as percent of procedures, primary index errors, any index 
errors listed, primary index as percent of procedures, any index as percent of procedures, 
primary index as percent of complications, and any index as percent of complications.  
 
 70
 
Table 13.  Analysis of Error Data by 6-Month Blocks   
Results for number and type of errors for each 6-month period.  The first two periods comprise the base year.  The third block is after 
training.  The total period includes all 18 months.  (P= Procedures; C=Comps=Complications; E=Errors). 
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First 6 mo. 802 26.0 3.2% 19.0 74.2 2.4 6.2 10.5 0.8 1.3 23.9 40.8 
Second 6 mo. 836 26.2 3.1% 18.0 69.3 2.2 8.0 12.0 1.0 1.4 32.2 46.5 
First Year 819            26.1 3.2% 18.5 71.7 2.3 7.1 11.3 0.9 1.4 28.1 43.6
Third 6 mo.             847 18.0 2.1% 13.2 72.3 1.6 5.0 7.7 0.6 0.9 27.4 41.5
Total Period             829 23.4 2.8% 16.7 71.9 2.0 6.4 10.1 0.8 1.2 27.9 42.971
 
 
 
 Table 14.  Analysis of Morbidity and Mortality Data by Month Over 18-Month Study Period   
P=Procedures; C=Comps=Complications; E=Errors. 
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Nov-05            798 42 5.3 29 69.0 3.6 8 20 1.0 2.5 19.0 47.6
Dec-05            767 10 1.3 8 80.0 1.0 2 5 0.3 0.7 20.0 50.0
Jan-06             927 25 2.7 20 80.0 2.2 7 10 0.8 1.1 28.0 40.0
Feb-06             761 26 3.4 21 80.8 2.8 8 9 1.1 1.2 30.8 34.6
Mar-06 811            27 3.3 22 81.5 2.7 3 5 0.4 0.6 11.1 18.5
Apr-06             748 26 3.5 14 53.8 1.9 9 14 1.2 1.9 34.6 53.8
May-06             929 27 2.9 22 81.5 2.4 13 17 1.4 1.8 48.1 63.0
Jun-06             709 20 2.8 15 75.0 2.1 10 11 1.4 1.6 50.0 55.0
Jul-06             822 32 3.9 21 65.6 2.6 4 12 0.5 1.5 12.5 37.5
Aug-06             902 24 2.7 19 79.2 2.1 10 12 1.1 1.3 41.7 50.0
Sep-06             857 26 3.0 14 53.8 1.6 6 8 0.7 0.9 23.1 30.8
Oct-06             799 28 3.5 17 60.7 2.1 5 12 0.6 1.5 17.9 42.9
Nov-06             935 22 2.4 19 86.4 2.0 7 13 0.7 1.4 31.8 59.1
Dec-06             683 16 2.3 12 75.0 1.8 3 5 0.4 0.7 18.8 31.3
Jan-07             851 18 2.1 13 72.2 1.5 5 7 0.6 0.8 27.8 38.9
Feb-07             826 20 2.4 15 75.0 1.8 6 9 0.7 1.1 30.0 45.0
Mar-07             900 16 1.8 11 68.8 1.2 3 4 0.3 0.4 18.8 25.0
Apr-07             888 16 1.8 9 56.3 1.0 6 8 0.7 0.9 37.5 50.0
SUM 14913 421   301                 
AVERAGE     2.8%   71.5% 2.0% 6.39 10 0.8% 1.2% 27.9% 42.9% 
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There was no difference in the number of errors, the number of primary index errors, or 
total index errors by Fisher’s Exact Test between the 6 month pre and post-training 
periods.  However, there was a significant regression with a decrease in the number and 
percent of complications and the number and percent of errors, which spanned the entire 
18 month period (Table 15).   
Visual evaluation of the graphical data suggests that the decreases began before 
the training and continued in a linear fashion after the training.  Specifically, there was no 
abrupt discontinuity in the data following the training.   Of more interest is the 
observation that there was no difference in the percent of Index Errors following training 
either by Fisher’s Exact Test or by regression.  In fact, it would appear that there was 
either no decrease or an actual increase in the index errors following training.  Data are 
graphically depicted in Figure 7, Surgical Procedures by Month and Monthly 
Complications and Errors; Figure 8, Errors as Percent of Procedures and Percent of 
Complications; Figure 9, Primary and Total Index Error by Procedure; and Figure 10, 
Primary and Total Index Error by Complication.  
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Table 15.  Regression Analysis of Principle Components Over Time   
Regressions were performed over the 18-month study period.  The number of procedures remained constant while the complication 
rate and error rate fell.  The error rate per complication was stable, and the rate of index errors did not change over the study period. 
(P=Procedures; C=Complications; E=Errors; p = Probability). 
 
Value per Month Mean         SEM SD Min Median Max Skewness Kurtosis Slope Intercept 
ANOVA 
Prob. (p) 
Procedures (P) 828.5 18 76.3 683 824 935 -0.26 -0.83 3.34 797 0.351 
Complications  (C) 23.4 1.7 7.23 10 24.5 42 0.61 1.56 -0.637 29.4 0.049 
Complications % 2.8% 0.22 0.92 1.3 2.75 5.3 0.88 1.86 -0.00087 0.037 0.032 
Errors (E) 16.7 1.26 5.37 8 16 29 0.36 0.06 -0.55 21.9 0.019 
E/C % 71.9% 2.4 10.2 53.8 75 86.4 -0.65 -0.74 -0.00545 0.771 0.252 
E/P % 2.0% 0.16 0.66 1 2.05 3.6 0.47 0.65 -0.00074 0.022 0.009 
Primary Index Errors  6.4 0.69 2.93 2 6 13 0.5 -0.08 -0.129 7.61 0.348 
Total Index Error 10.01 1.02 4.32 4 9.5 20 0.63 0.22 -0.304 12.9 0.124 
Primary Index Error/P % 0.72% 0.11 0.46 0 1 1 -1.08 -0.94 0.00001 0.0071 0.962 
Total Index Error/P % 1.2%           0.12 0.53 0.4 1.15 2.5 0.68 0.48 -0.00044 0.016 0.067
Primary Index Error/C % 27.9% 2.68 11.4 11.1 27.9 50 0.49 -0.49 0.00141 0.265 0.794 
Total Index Error/C % 42.9% 2.82 12 18.5 43.95 63 -0.31 -0.41 -0.00238 0.452 0.675 
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Monthly Complications and Errors
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Figure 7. Surgical Procedures, Complications, and Errors by Month 
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Figure 8.  Errors as Percent of Procedures and Percent of Complications   
The percentage of procedures associated with a reported error (upper) and the percentage 
of complications reported to have been associated with an error (lower). 
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Total Index Error per Procedure
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Figure 9.  Index Error as Percent of Procedures   
The percentage of procedures associated with an index error reported as the primary error 
(upper) and the percentage of procedures reported with any index error (lower). 
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 Primary Index Error per Complication
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Figure 10.  Index Error as Percent of Complications   
The percentage of reported complications with an index error as the primary error (upper) 
and the percentage of reported complications with any reported index error (lower). 
 
78
 
There was no difference in the overall distribution of outcomes (Table 16) and no 
difference between the likelihood of “serious error” (Outcome Scores 3+4+5).   
Table  16 .  The Outcome Scores Before and After Training  
Outcome 
Score Outcome Pre-Training Post-Training 
5 Death 16% 17% 
4 Disability 9% 9% 
3 Temp Disability 25% 22% 
2 Prolonged 35% 38% 
1 No Adverse Effect 15% 13% 
 
The distribution of the impact of the error on the outcome (what percentage of the 
complication was due to the medical error in 25% increments) was compared before and 
after training by Kolmogorov Smirnov testing.  There was no difference in the 
distribution of impact (pre-mean =63.0% impact, SD 29.2; post-mean=63.8% impact, SD 
31.0; KS= .82). 
Trendlines (Figure 11) were developed to assess the data over the 18 month study 
timeline.  Significant trends were identified across the entire study period and 
demonstrated a progressive decrease in complication rate and error rate.  The level of 
surgical activity was constant over the entire 18 months.  Analysis of the complication 
rate by month for the 12 month period immediately preceding the initiation of the study 
showed a very consistent complication rate with no evidence of decrease over time.  
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Trend lines did not demonstrate a decrease in the percentage of errors attributable to the 
first index error reported (primary index error) or any index error reported (any error). 
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Figure 11.  Trend Analysis for Complications, Errors, Index Errors   
Trend lines over the entire 18-month study period for monthly complication rate, monthly 
error rate,  monthly index error rate, percent of complications with a primary index error, 
and percent of complications with any index error. 
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5. Discussion 
 
 Since the publication of “To Err is Human,” now almost 8 years ago, there has 
been a plethora of studies and articles relating to the subject of medical error.  More 
importantly, there has been a groundswell of interest in the development of programs to 
train individuals and teams to minimize error112-114.  However, there have been very few 
studies which actually look at patient outcomes in measuring whether the program is 
effective, and even fewer studies which define a rigorous methodology with validation 
and reliability testing.  This is particularly true in surgery, where there have been no 
published studies which actually measure the impact of medical error on surgical patient 
outcome.  This study has attempted to present a methodology to develop and validate a 
classification system for error, develop a training program designed to address the most 
common types of errors, and then measure whether the training program improved 
patient outcomes over the time period following the training. 
5.1 Analysis of Results 
 It appears quite clear that the study as a whole resulted in a sizable decrease in 
medical errors, no matter how this was quantitatively expressed.  There were fewer 
complications, both in absolute number and as a percentage of procedures performed. 
There were fewer errors, both in absolute number and as a percentage of procedures 
performed.  Thus it appears safe to conclude that the overall program was effective in 
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enhancing the actual outcomes of patients undergoing major surgical procedures.  It is 
less clear what was responsible for that impact.  Analysis of the pre-training baseline data 
already demonstrated a significant reduction in complications over the 12 month period.  
Examination of the trendlines confirms that there is a fairly constant decrement in both 
complications and errors that would appear to antedate the actual training program.  And 
most importantly, there did not seem to be any change in the percentage of errors that 
were attributable to the index errors which were the subject of the training.   
The data demonstrate that there was in fact a steady state condition over the 18 
months, as evidenced by a very constant number of procedures, a constant distribution of 
outcome scores, and a consistent contribution of error to complications.   Review of the 
number and percent of complications during the twelve months prior to initiation of this 
study clearly showed that the reported complication rate was stable.  Since the pilot study 
had taken place for several months before the actual baseline data collection commenced, 
one would assume that the “halo effect” of a change in reporting would most likely be 
past.  Similarly, any “Hawthorne Effect,” a temporary change in behavior related to the 
fact that there was a “study,” would be expected to demonstrate an early change followed 
by a return to baseline.  This study showed a continuous and ongoing effect over the 18 
month period, no decrease after the training, and no rebound return to baseline after time 
had elapsed post-training.  It therefore seemed surprising that there was a continued slow 
decrease in the numbers of complications and the numbers of errors.  The absence of a 
discrete effect of the training on either the trend lines or on the index errors suggests that 
the training program itself was perhaps a minor contributor and the major factor leading 
to the improvement in patient outcome was attributable to the fact that everyone in the 
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program, resident and attending alike, was participating in error analysis on a weekly 
basis over a greater than 18 month period.  Perhaps it was the sustained awareness of the 
possibility of error, due both to repetition as well as to expectation, that impacted the 
“culture” of the surgical program. 
 It is otherwise difficult to explain the seeming paradox that there was no apparent 
focused effect of the training on the material actually trained, yet there was a substantial 
decrease in the incidence of complications and errors.  It is certainly true that the 
measurable outcome, complications, was self-reported and thus there is a possibility of 
inaccurate reporting.  Countering this is the fact that this reporting mechanism has been 
in place for over two decades, is widely accepted, and undergoes weekly oversight by the 
chairman and the faculty of the department of surgery.  Similarly, the marked consistency 
of the distribution of outcome scores and the attribution of impact before and after 
training would suggest that the likelihood of bias in data reporting is small.  If there had 
been a change in reporting, major adverse outcomes (including disability and death) 
would continue to be reported, and a change in the reporting of lesser complications 
would alter the distribution of outcome scores or percent error.  No change in outcome 
score was seen, suggesting that both major and minor complications continued to be 
reported accurately. 
 Another theoretical concern is that the training itself was not actually effective.  
Although there had been an extensive effort made and supporting data gathered to 
indicate that the training would be highly likely to be effective, it is certainly possible that 
the training was not, in fact, effective.  However, this training module was subjected to 
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substantially more analysis and oversight than the majority of training tools used in 
surgical education suggesting that it was at least as effective as most comparable training 
exercises.   It is probably not that surprising that a single, non-repeating training session, 
no matter how well designed and implemented, without reinforcment and without 
additional feedback, would have minimal transfer from the training environment to the 
work environment. 
 Is it possible that the residents were already well trained in error analysis, and 
thus the additional training would produce little to no effect?  While this can’t be 
summarily dismissed, there is no evidence that any training had taken place prior to this 
study. It would appear that residents were “naïve” to error analysis and reporting, and 
error analysis was not a component of either the didactic or clinical experience of the 
residents. 
Also, it is certainly possible that the wrong group of subjects was trained.  Most 
of the major decisions regarding surgical procedures are made by attending surgeons, not 
residents.  Specifically, the types of errors identified as being the most common 
(judgment errors, incomplete understanding of the problem, carelessness/inattention to 
detail) are attributable mostly to the attending physician.  This factor cannot be 
overlooked in the interpretation of the data.  Until a study focused on the attending 
surgeon is conducted, it is not possible to say whether training the attending physicians 
might have had a more noticeable impact on the incidence of index errors.  However, in 
spite of this concern, there appears to have been a significant reduction in complications 
and errors over the course of the study period. 
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 This study has made a number of important observations which certainly must be 
verified by additional well designed trials. 
Hypothesis 1.  Is it possible to create a valid classification system for errors occurring in 
surgery?  Yes, using the published literature as a basis for the classification and using 
experts in surgery and in patient safety, it is possible to create a useful classification 
system for surgical error.  Although there are still traditional perceptions among surgeons 
on the nature and types of error as well as the “onus” of error in general, it is surprising 
that the agreement among a large number of academic surgeons in the absence of specific 
training in medical error was so substantial and consistent across three different surgical 
scenarios  and a wide range of academic institutions. 
 Of perhaps greater interest is that the use of the classification system, both in the 
validation studies as well as in the actual data collection, showed that the overwhelming 
majority of errors occurring in association with surgical complications are NOT due to 
system problems or communication problems.  This may be due to the fact that the study 
was not specifically designed to analyze the possibility of a “cascade” of errors.  
However, this study suggests that perhaps in fields of medicine where significant 
responsibility and direct risk of harm are in the hands of a single individual, the surgeon, 
the number of errors due to the surgeon him/herself may be substantially larger than the 
background risk of system and communication errors cited in the current literature.  If 
this observation is true, it supports the concept that the types of errors most likely to 
occur may be different in different fields of medicine and therefore that there is a need for 
specific classification systems in different fields of medicine. 
87
 
 It is also important to highlight that the most “popular” surgical errors currently 
being discussed and reported as “sentinel events,” wrong side surgery, wrong patient 
surgery, wrong operation, did not occur during the entire 18 month experience.  This 
suggests that the “extreme” errors that are reported to national and state organizations as 
sentinel events are a very small fraction of total error and that they may not be reflective 
of the types of errors occurring on a day to day basis in the conduct of surgery. 
Hypothesis 2.  Can this classification system demonstrate reliability when used by 
practicing academic physicians?  Yes.  As demonstrated in this study, there is a high 
degree of consistency among academic surgeons.  There is perhaps room for additional 
refinement in the classification system, but overall the reliability exceeds the benchmark 
of 70% recommended by Wallace.  One might argue that the terminology used, originally 
selected to be more easily understandable and interpretable by surgeons, was not 
sufficiently exclusive, since surgeons seemed to have difficulty deciding whether the 
error was due to a specific type of index error.  Perhaps a different breakdown of the 
individual human factors might be more exclusively and consistently applied to avoid 
changing the data collection instrument after it was implemented.  As used in this study, 
the data instrument was applied identically in both the pre-training and post-training 
setting.  It was quite interesting, however, to note that surgeons had a similar level of 
disagreement about whether an error had occurred as they had in deciding the specific 
human factor which was involved in a given scenario.  This variability appeared to be 
less within the local institution data, suggesting that there is an “institutional 
understanding” of what constitutes error, and that this varies from institution to 
institution.  As additional studies are published which lead to a more “standardized” 
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definition of error within the field of surgery, it is likely that the variability between 
institutions and the variability between surgeons in their understanding of medical error 
will be minimized.  This observation suggests that such studies must include a component 
of very structured training of the individuals who are going to report error. 
Hypothesis 3.  Can we determine a baseline incidence of the types of common errors?  
Yes.  The data would suggest that at the very least, the first 6 months of baseline data 
collection was similar to the data collected during the pilot study.  In addition, even when 
the incidence of complications and errors was decreasing, the distribution of patient 
outcomes and the attribution of impact of the errors was remarkably consistent. 
Hypothesis 4.  Can we reliably identify the most common types of errors in an academic 
surgical setting?  Yes.  Both the validation data and the baseline data demonstrate that 
surgeons in an academic setting, with minimal specific training in medical error can 
reliably assess the presence and type of error (as demonstrated by greater than 70% 
agreement, agreement between outside academic surgeons and internal ongoing data 
collection, and constancy within an institution over an 18 month period of data 
collection).  The data, at least as collected, show that the majority of errors occurring in 
surgery are not system errors or communication errors.  This may be counter to current 
“wisdom” in the field of error analysis, and it is likely that the outcomes would be very 
different in fields such as radiation oncology or anesthesiology, where the actual “action” 
is very dependent on equipment, where the consequences of actions are in fact very 
tightly “coupled” ( doing “x” likely leads immediately to “y”).  This observation 
reinforces our recommendation that classification systems for error should be specialty 
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specific, based on data collected in that specialty.  At least as observed in this study, 
human factors appear to be responsible for the majority of errors in surgery, and these 
tend to cluster around the actions of the surgeon in the specific areas referred to as index 
errors:  errors in judgment, incomplete understanding of the problem, and 
carelessness/inattention to detail.) 
Hypothesis 5.  Can we measure the impact of error on the actual outcomes of patients?  
Yes.  The validity testing among the academic surgeons demonstrated a high degree of 
consistency in scoring the outcome and defining the degree to which the complication 
was the result of error.  This was further supported by the consistent responses over time 
in the broader clinical context of baseline and post-training data collection.  In fact, the 
total surgical experience of a large, complex academic institution, as measured in the 
baseline data collection, showed remarkable stability in the decisions of the surgeons 
reporting the impact of error on patient outcome. 
Hypothesis 6.  Can we develop and validate a simulation-based training module for 
resident physicians?  Yes.  Using the experience of a large number of academic surgeons 
and then reviewed by other groups of academic surgeons with special expertise in 
developing training materials resulted in a “training package” which was  determined to 
be “effective.”  It is of some concern that this training program did not appear to 
“transfer” to the work environment.  The training program used in this study is at least as 
rigorous as the majority of training materials currently in use in graduate medical 
education.  Further, the degree of review and analysis was substantially greater than is 
typically used in medical training programs. One can conclude that it is possible to 
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validate the training module as perceived by experts.  One cannot necessarily extend that 
assessment to include the effectiveness of the module to transfer to the workplace and 
improve patient outcome. 
Hypothesis 7.  Can a validated training module improve surgical outcomes after a cohort 
of residents is trained?  Uncertain.  It is clear that the overall project resulted in a 
substantial decrease in complications and also in errors.  So the overall project resulted in 
an improvement in patient outcome.  But it is not clear that the actual training module 
was responsible for this outcome.  It may be more likely that the continuous exposure to 
analysis of error resulted in a systemic change in attitudes and a greater awareness of 
error.  It is not possible to conclusively answer this question at this time, although the 
trend line analysis clearly suggests that the change in outcome was apparent months 
before the training module was conducted.  Most importantly, there is no evidence of any 
change in the types of errors specifically trained, either in a before or after, distribution 
free comparison or in the regression analysis with ANOVA. 
Power Analysis.  Using the number of surgical procedures performed as the 
determining factor for sample size, and not error, a power of 0.10 would require about 
7000 procedures in each group.  Since there were over 9000 procedures in the baseline 
group, and approximately 5000 procedures in the post-training group, the power of a 
before-after comparison is probably about 0.20.  The regression or trend line of the data 
over the entire 18 months should be sufficiently powered to be able to identify a 
difference if a difference is present. 
91
 
Confidence.  Confidence must be considered from both the statistical sense as 
well as the reasonability sense.   Statistically, 95% confidence intervals were utilized for 
all comparisons and all regressions.  The Kolmogorov Smirnov test was used to assess 
normality of the data when parametric procedures were employed.  Fisher’s Exact Test 
was used to analyze frequency data to avoid the need to consider normality, particularly 
when addressing conditional probabilities and frequencies.  Consequently the data 
analysis should be rigorous and unbiased, and therefore likely to be “accurate.”  Of more 
importance, however, is the level of confidence that the final conclusion is consistent 
with modern theories of training (reasonability).  Particularly since our conclusions 
question several concepts that are currently strongly held, most notably that the errors in 
surgery were NOT typically system errors or communication errors and that a well 
designed training module did not appear to produce improvements in the quality of care, 
the results must also “make sense.”  To accomplish this, it is important to clearly 
distinguish between the literature in “patient safety” and the literature in “organizational 
training.”  Clearly, the training literature is emphatic that effective training requires 
repetition, frequent assessment with feedback, overlearning, and reinforcement, which 
were not a component of this training module nor is it typically included in most 
“courses” provided for residents.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to accept with confidence 
that a single training module, no matter how well designed and implemented, may NOT 
transfer to the clinical environment at a different time and place.  Similarly, it is 
reasonable to accept that requiring the residents to consider the possibility of error in a 
formal way every week over an extended period of time IS very likely to result in a 
sustained attention to the possibility of error, which could become incorporated into the 
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day to day activities of the workplace (transfer of training).   Isolated training modules 
are certainly useful, but as an adjunct to a larger, more robust and sustained training 
process that will impact on the broader culture of the medical learning and practice 
environment. 
5.2 Future Plans   
  This study has raised two very provocative possibilities: 1.) that in some areas of 
healthcare individual human factors errors may be more important causes of adverse 
events than system or communication error, and 2.) that well designed single episode 
training sessions may not transfer to the workplace to patient outcome. The most 
important next step is to reproduce the results.  This will require conducting a similar 
study at a new clinical site.  Although much of the validation and reliability testing will 
not need to be repeated, baseline data will need to be accumulated.  As evidenced in this 
study, the collection of only 6 months of baseline data would probably have overlooked 
the importance of the changes which occurred during the baseline period as a 
consequence of the weekly data analysis and reporting.  Therefore it will require a model 
similar to the present study.  However, this study demonstrated that the percentage of 
major complications associated with error may be stable, suggesting that a corroborating 
study could use historical complication rates over a period of time, compared to similarly 
collected complication rates after a training experience.  While such a study would not 
include “granular” information regarding types of errors, outcome scores, impact on 
patients, it could be done much more simply.  Alternatively, a study could introduce a 
regular error analysis to the existing morbidity and mortality process, WITHOUT a 
93
 
formal training module, to determine if simply having residents analyze and report errors 
will result in a decrease in complications and errors. 
 A provocative possibility for future study is training the attending physicians 
instead of the residents.  Since many of the decisions made in the planning and execution 
of a surgical procedure, including preoperative and postoperative care, are either made or 
approved by the attending physician, training the attending may be more effective than 
training the resident.  Whether this is culturally feasible in most institutions will 
determine whether such a study can be conducted. 
 Future studies might include several components which were not included in this 
study.   Such additional measures might include a cascade analysis, to determine if the 
evident error is a component of a chain of errors; a systems analysis, to determine if the 
evident error is a component of a system of organized activities; and a preventability 
analysis, to determine if and at what stage the error could reasonably have been identified 
and prevented from occurring.  These were not included because of the substantial 
advanced knowledge that would be required of the individuals submitting the weekly 
information, which would have biased the interpretation of any results.  Inclusion of these 
supplementary considerations in future studies will enhance the robustness of the 
conclusions and facilitate the future application of patient safety training.  This would 
presumably require a highly trained staff for data collection and a formal training 
program for the physicians. 
 An important component of error analysis is the recognition of latent errors (near 
miss).  An effective program of near miss analysis will contribute substantially to the 
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identification of latent errors, before they occur.  In this study, the voluntary program of 
near miss reporting was unsuccessful.  There are many reasons to explain this.  It was 
inconvenient.  It required initiative on the part of the resident to report.  It involved an 
interruption of workflow.  It wasn’t “user-friendly” in the sense of a well-designed “front 
end” with prompts and selections to facilitate reporting.  A well-designed, easy-to-use, 
and readily available process that does not interrupt workflow, should allow reporting 
and analysis of a high volume of near misses and potentially uncover latent system errors 
which may contribute to or underlie the human factor errors recognized in the post-hoc 
analysis of surgical complications. Recognition of the most common types of near miss 
events could be extremely helpful in designing future training modules to minimize 
surgical error. 
5.3 Conclusion  
This study has demonstrated that it is possible to develop and validate a 
classification system for error in surgery.  In addition, the data have demonstrated that the 
types of errors in surgery may be different than in other areas of medicine, reaffirming 
that error classification is probably domain specific, and suggesting a benchmark that 
studies which address medical error should focus on the types of error likely to occur and 
include validation of the classification system utilized.  Finally, since the purpose of 
analyzing errors and developing training programs to enhance patient safety is to actually 
decrease medical errors, programs that are intended to improve patient safety should 
actually measure outcomes that are relevant to patient safety.  This should include the 
95
 
analysis of the types, frequency, and severity of error within the relevant medical content 
domain. 
This study has demonstrated that the process of measuring error on a regular basis 
as a component of morbidity and mortality analysis leads to a sustained reduction in 
complications presumably by decreasing the errors which appear to be tightly linked to 
them.  It also suggests that a one-time, focused training program which addresses 
specific, common types of errors may have minimal effect on patient outcomes.  
Recurring training with feedback and reinforcement may rectify this apparent limitation.   
 Most importantly, this study supports the concept that it is the culture of safety 
which will influence patient outcome, more than a specific training program.  To the 
degree that training modules consistently maintain and augment this culture of safety, 
they will be an important component.  Emphasis on the training module rather than on the 
culture may have limited effect on the goal of this endeavor, safer surgical care for 
patients. 
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Appendix 1.  Letter to Expert Evaluators for External Validation of Scoring 
Template 
Dear Doctor, 
I recently made the decision to pursue a PhD in Industrial Engineering.  I know it sounds 
crazy, but I believe it will help me to address the systems and processes problems which 
plague modern healthcare and, more particularly, graduate medical education.  My 
dissertation project involves the intersection of three important themes: GME, patient 
safety, and medical simulation.  In order to proceed, I need to validate a scoring form 
which I designed for morbidity and mortality conference.  The intended use is that each 
complication gets evaluated to determine if there was a medical error, some 
characteristics of the medical error, the actual type of error involved, and the percentage 
of the complication that seems attributable to the error (as opposed to the disease). 
As an expert in the field of academic surgery, I would like you to take just a few minutes 
and complete a scoring template on three very brief scenarios.  In each case, there clearly 
was a complication.  I would like you to determine: 
1. what was the complication (just a few words) 
2. if the complication was due to a medical error 
3. if the medical error occurred during evaluation or execution 
4. if the error was a “slip” (doing the right thing but incorrectly) 
5. if the error was a “mistake” (doing the wrong thing) 
6. what types of error (can be more than one) are involved, by placing a “1” in the 
appropriate box for the most important, a “2” for the next most important, etc. 
7. which of the ACGME core competencies appears to be involved 
8. what percentage of the complication can be attributed to the error (in multiples of 
25%) 
Your response is anonymous.  I will only track two pieces of information: what 
institution you are from (by a code number, not name) and how many years since you 
finished your general surgery residency (provided by you). 
I am including the three scenarios, a glossary of terms, and three scoring templates.  You 
can return them in the included envelope or by FAX to ………….   
Thank you in advance for your help.  I believe this project will lead to a significant 
improvement in how we teach residents and, ultimately, how we provide surgical care to 
our patients. 
Sincerely,  
Peter J. Fabri M.D. 
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Appendix 2. Mock-up of Scoring Template with Instructions 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Error Template as Sent to Evaluators
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Appendix 3.  Glossary of Terms Used in the Error Template and Instructions  
 
Glossary of Terms Used in Error Analysis 
 
ERROR- a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of 
mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, not by chance. 
 
VIOLATION- a generic term to describe actions that are wrong, that violate “the law”.  
For example, running a red light. 
 
ADVERSE EVENT- an error in which patient harm has occurred. 
 
NEAR MISS- an error which is “caught” before any harm has occurred.  This could be 
that the event was planned or even initiated but not actually carried out, or it could be 
carried out and the adverse effect was prevented from occurring. 
 
SLIPS AND LAPSES are errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or 
storage of an action sequence. (doing perhaps the correct thing, but doing it incorrectly). 
 
MISTAKES are deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or inferential processes 
involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it 
(doing the wrong thing). 
 
ERRORS typically occur either during evaluation/planning or during execution.  Errors 
occurring during evaluation/planning are generally “mistakes”.  Errors occurring during 
execution are generally “slips”.  Errors occurring during information processing are 
generally “lapses”. 
 
ERROR TYPES.  Errors are usually divided into three main categories, organizational, 
technical, and human.   
 
HEALTH SYSTEM ERROR (Organizational or System Error).  This category can 
include any error due to failure of the “system” in getting things done.  It could be an 
error of commission (this is how the organization does things) or omission (we don’t 
have a procedure to prevent that.) 
 
TECHNICAL/MECHANICAL ERROR.  In healthcare, the term technical is often 
associated with “technique”.  To avoid confusion, we consider a “technical error” to be a 
human error and not a mechanical malfunction.  Thus there are organizational (health 
system), mechanical, and human errors. 
 
HUMAN FACTORS.  There are many classification systems for error caused by how 
humans function as individuals.  The classification system is often specific to the type of 
activity being performed and uses language comfortable to the individuals working in the 
area.  In surgery, we have identified the following workable classification system: 
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Appendix 3.  (Continued) 
 
Incomplete understanding of the problem – making a decision or committing an 
action based on incomplete or inaccurate information.  This is an error of cognition.  
 Failure to follow an existing protocol- not using a protocol where one exists and is 
known. 
 Inattention to detail- usually misinterpreting subtle findings.  This is usually an 
error  due to haste or carelessness.  
 Error in diagnosis- This specifically relates to when a diagnosis has been made 
and an action taken, but the diagnosis was formally incorrect. 
 Failure in communication- This type of error occurs when there is a 
communication breakdown between human beings that leads to someone committing an 
error. 
 Error in judgment- this occurs when an individual violates a “rule”, but has 
correct information. 
 
 Delay in diagnosis/treatment.  This error occurs when an excessive amount of 
time has elapsed, leading to progression of disease or a complication of disease. 
 Error of omission- This error occurs when someone fails to do something 
indicated. 
 Technical error- This error occurs in the process of a procedure requiring 
technical skill, in which the procedure is not done sufficiently well.  This could be due to 
insufficient understanding of what to do or just not doing it well enough. 
 
INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM.  This is NOT the same as error in 
diagnosis, although it could be closely related.  For example, if a patient on a ventilator is 
hypoventilating and having respiratory difficulty, you don’t figure out that the tube is 
down the main stem bronchus, and the patient arrests, that’s incomplete understanding of 
problem.  But if you put in a chest tube, that’s an error in diagnosis.  In the first case, you 
made the correct diagnosis but didn’t figure out the exact mechanism.  If it took you four 
hours to figure this out, it would ALSO be a delay error.  So this error term means you 
didn’t get all the way to the end of the diagnostic tree. 
 
FAILURE TO USE ESTABLISHED PROTOCOL  An example of this could be in a 
code, in a trauma resuscitation, etc, if you fail to use the ACLS or ATLS protocol.  This 
should be used when there is actually a protocol that everybody is aware of.  NOT just 
this isn’t the way we usually do it!  It could also be a chemotherapy protocol, or a dialysis 
protocol, or a TPN protocol. 
 
CARELESSNESS/INATTENTION TO DETAIL   This error code should be used when 
there really was carelessness or inattention to detail and not a scapegoat term for another 
type of error (e.g. communication error, judgment error) although the two could certainly 
coexist.  This occurs when somebody really isn’t paying attention.  For example, if you 
pack the small bowel under a towel and hold it out of the field with a wide retractor, only 
to find out an hour later that a segment of the small bowel infarcted because of blocked  
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Appendix 3.  (Continued) 
 
blood supply.  Or you are coming across the transverse mesocolon and divide the 
superior mesenteric artery instead of the middle colic. (this could also be a technique 
error).   Or taking out a segment of the colon that turns out not to include the pathology. 
 
ERROR IN DIAGNOSIS  This term applies when you treat the patient for disease X and 
the patient has disease Y.  In the simplest case, taking out a normal appendix is an error 
in diagnosis.  As a more complex example, opening a chest for cardiac tamponade in the 
ICU in a patient with a tension pneumothorax is an error in diagnosis. 
 
COMMUNICATION ERROR   This could include a botched verbal order, as well as a 
failure to communicate.  Make sure the actual error is related to the communication and 
not to something else. 
 
JUDGMENT ERROR  This error type should be assigned when it is clear that someone 
with more experience wouldn’t have made this mistake.    This could also be a secondary 
type of error combined with another type. 
 
DELAY ERROR  This type of error should be considered when there is clearly a 
temporal delay which contributed to the patient outcome.  If the patient outcome was not 
affected by the delay, it probably isn’t a delay error. 
  
ERROR OF OMISSION  This occurs when something important isn’t done.  If it is part 
of a written  
protocol, it would be a protocol failure.  Not getting an appropriate imaging study in a 
patient with  
an aortic aneurysm and hypertension and the patient developing postoperative renal 
failure might be an error of omission.  Or failure to use DVT prophylaxis in a situation 
where it would be considered to be important (malignancy, obesity, long procedure, prior 
DVT, etc.) 
 
TECHNIQUE ERROR  I think we all know this when we see it.  Cutting the common 
duct (although it could also be carelessness), obstructing the renal artery on an aortic 
aneurysm repair, etc.  Use this when the complication is actually do to something that 
was done to the patient which, if done correctly, would have avoided the complication. 
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Appendix 4.  Instructions for Using the Error Evaluation Template 
The instructions for completing the template are straightforward.  The sheet is divided 
into three areas, numbered 1, 2, 3.  At the bottom is an abbreviated set of instructions for 
reference. 
Section 1 is a set of simple statements.  For “Patient ID”, indicate the scenario number, 1, 
2, or 3.  Leave “Reviewer” blank.  Enter a number from 1-5 from the instructions at the 
bottom to indicate your assessment of the severity of the complication.  
Please note that a “1” means that there was definitely a complication (e.g. 
enterotomy, arterial injury, the wrong medication but without adverse effect, etc.) 
but there was no adverse effect on the patient noted.   
A “2” means that the patient was affected adversely, probably lengthening 
hospital stay,  but this didn’t translate into a significant impact on the patient and 
no disability (minor wound infection, cystitis treated with oral antibiotics, etc.)    
A “3” means when the patient left the hospital, there was still some definite 
disability (major wound affecting mobility, swollen leg, still needed oxygen, etc.  
A “4” means the patient will almost certainly have a permanent disability.   
A “5” means the patient died, period, regardless of cause. 
Next, answer the simple questions.  First, yes, there was a complication.  Otherwise we 
wouldn’t be here.  Was there an error?  If no, you don’t need to do any more.  If yes, was 
the error in evaluation/assessment/planning or was it an error of execution/commission?  
Was the error due to a “slip” (doing the right thing incorrectly) or a mistake (doing the 
wrong thing).  Assume that it can’t be both. 
Section 2 has two parts, identifying the types of medical error involved on the left side, 
and identifying which ACGME competency might be involved on the right side.  For the 
medical error, there can be more than one.  Put a “1” next to the most important error, 
followed by “2”, “3”, etc next to any additional errors you think are involved. 
Section 3 asks you to identify in increments of 25%, how much of the complication that 
you scored at the beginning you would attribute to the error(s) you identified (the 
remainder being due to the patients disease processes rather than the treatment. 
Thanks again for your help. 
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Appendix 5.  Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 1 for External Validation 
A 45 year old female was admitted to the hospital for an elective laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy.  She had a prior hysterectomy through a Pfannenstiel incision a number 
of years ago and has had no other previous abdominal surgery.  Prior to beginning the 
operation, we verified a lower abdominal “smile” incision just above the pubis.  An 
infraumbilical curvilinear incision was made and the umbilicus mobilized.  The umbilical 
ring was bluntly dilated with a Kelly clamp and a port was introduced into the peritoneal 
cavity.  As soon as the scope was introduced, succus was seen.  The procedure was 
converted to open and a tear was confirmed in a loop of ileum adherent to the umbilicus.  
This was repaired and the gall bladder was removed.  There were no postoperative 
complications. 
Errors: 1. Judgment  2. Technique 
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Appendix 6. Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 2 for External Validation 
A 72 year old male was admitted through the Emergency Department after presenting 
with a complaint of left back pain.  He is known to be hypertensive and a smoker.  An 
abdominal CT scan confirms the presence of an abdominal aortic aneurysm with a 
confined area of leak into the retroperitoneum.  After initial stabilization, he is brought to 
the operating room and undergoes a transabdominal aortic aneurysm repair with a tube 
graft.  There is no back-bleeding noted from the inferior mesenteric artery orifice, which 
is oversewn prior to placing the graft. The iliac vessels are calcified but not aneurysmal.  
Prior to abdominal closure, the sigmoid colon is noted to be normal and signals can be 
heard on the antimesenteric border with the Doppler.  Postoperatively he does well and is 
transferred from the intensive care unit on POD #2.  On POD #5, he notes lower 
abdominal pain which progresses.  Abdominal films are obtained which demonstrate free 
air.  He is returned to the operating room and is found to have an ischemic perforation of 
the sigmoid colon.  The sigmoid colon is resected and an end colostomy with closure of 
the distal colon  (Hartmann procedure) are performed.  The case is discussed at Morbidity 
and Mortality conference in detail and it is determined that the standard of care had been 
met, and with  discussion of  possible alternatives of postoperative care including a 
second look procedure and postoperative proctoscopy.  On POD #5 after his colostomy, 
the patient has still not opened up.  Abdominal films confirm gas through the GI tract, 
including a somewhat dilated colon.  A gastrograffin enema per rectum demonstrates 
passage of the contrast into the colostomy bag.  The patient is taken back to the operating 
room where it is noted that the distal rectum was brought up as the colostomy and the end 
of the sigmoid colon was left stapled and oversewn.  This was corrected and the patient 
recovered without incident.  
Error: 1. Inattention to detail 
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Appendix 7.  Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 3 for External Validation 
A 56 year old female was admitted through the emergency room with signs and 
symptoms of intestinal obstruction.  She did not have any evidence of an acute abdomen, 
although her abdomen was tender to palpation.  She was noted to have had multiple prior 
operations, and she had a large piece of mesh placed in her anterior abdominal wall to 
repair an incisional hernia at her last operation.  She had received radiation therapy to the 
pelvis in the remote past.  She weighs over 300 pounds and has had prior admissions for 
intestinal obstruction which have all resolved without need for operation.  Abdominal 
films demonstrated scattered air-fluid levels at multiple levels of the small bowel and 
minimal gas in the colon, but with no free air or pneumatosis.  A CT scan of the abdomen 
was performed which confirmed dilated loops of intestine and raised the question of a 
closed loop of bowel, although there was gas apparently distal to this area.  Her WBC 
was 20,000, but the remainder of her laboratory studies, including amylase and blood 
gases, were normal.  She was taken immediately to surgery.  At operation, there was no 
clear transition point noted, no obvious closed loop obstruction, and no ischemic bowel.  
The mesh was densely adherent to the intestine and several enterotomies were made, 
necessitating resection of a segment of small intestine with primary anastomosis.  Her 
abdomen was closed by reapproximating the prior mesh, which was densely incorporated 
into the abdominal wall without any separation.  On postoperative day three, she was 
noted to have intestinal contents draining from her incision.  Her fascia was opened 
locally and the site of drainage from the intestine could be seen in the open wound.  
Error: Judgment 
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Appendix 8.  Scenario Script:  Operating Room 
Scene opening: Two men, one older, one younger, in scrub suits at the scrub sink 
scrubbing their hands for surgery.  The older is the surgeon and the younger is a resident. 
Surgeon:  Gee, Bob.  I really wish I didn’t have to do this complicated redo case now 
after being up all night with that trauma patient. 
Resident:  Why don’t we ask the OR supervisor and the nurse anesthetist if we can delay 
the case until this afternoon so that you can get some rest.  The patient isn’t asleep yet. 
Surgeon: No.  That wouldn’t be fair to the patient.  Besides, I was trained to work without 
any sleep.   
Fade out and fade into the middle of the surgical procedure.  The surgeons are in the 
middle of the operation.  The anesthetist is behind the ether screen, but visible.  The scrub 
nurse is there, next to the surgeon.  The surgeons appear to be working deep in the pelvis.   
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you losing much blood down there? 
Surgeon:  Nope, everything is pretty dry. 
Short time passes 
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you sure you’re not losing blood? 
Surgeon: We’re fine here, Suzie, really. 
Short time passes.  The nurse anesthetist hangs a unit of blood.  Short time passes. 
Surgeon:  Suzie, I think something is wrong, the blood looks awfully dark.  Is everything 
okay?  (continuing to work in the pelvis) 
Short time passes: 
Nurse Anesthetist:  We have a problem here.  I’ve given a boatload of fluid and some 
blood.  I’m having trouble with the blood pressure.  I started some phenylephrine to bring 
his pressure up. 
Surgeon:  You gave him blood!  Why didn’t you tell me you were giving blood.  We 
haven’t lost much at all.  You really ought to tell me before you give my patients blood. 
And when did you start the phenylephrine.  Can you get the anesthesiologist in here right 
away? 
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Appendix 8.  (Continued) 
Anesthesiologist enters:  Well, looking at the EKG I would say that we’re in the middle 
of an MI.  You better hurry up and get this patient to the ICU. 
Fade out, fade in.  Still in the OR. 
Scrub nurse: It looks like we’re missing a sponge, doctor. 
Surgeon: That’s all I need!  (puts his arm into the pelvis)  Nope, no sponges here.  Let’s 
close.  I’m sure we have all the sponges out. 
Scrub nurse: Don’t you think we should get an x-ray? 
Surgeon:  How long is it going to take? 
Scrub nurse:   Probably ten minutes at most. 
Surgeon: No, let’s get out of here.  This guy needs to get to the ICU. 
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Appendix 9.  Armchair Conference  
Set up like a Sunday morning talk show.  One person in suit, three in scrub suits. 
MC- Welcome, doctors.  You had a chance to review the case.  What are your thoughts? 
Doctor 1.  Well, I think there were several things that could have been improved.  First, I 
think the surgeon has a responsibility to the patient to be awake and alert.  Recent 
evidence is very clear that fatigue really does impair performance.  The problem is that 
the surgeon isn’t aware of the impairment.  I think the surgeon should have made the 
effort to get the case postponed until the afternoon. 
Doctor 2.  I agree.  But it isn’t part of the culture of surgery.  We all think that we can do 
anything and everything.   
Doctor 3.  It isn’t part of the culture of the operating room either.  But the surgeon is 
responsible for the patient and really needs to take a leadership role here. 
Doctor 1.  Then I think there was poor communication during the procedure.  Generally 
when the anesthetist asks me if I’m losing blood, it means there is something wrong at 
the head of the table.  As the surgeon, I need to take the initiative to ask a few questions.  
Maybe it wouldn’t have made a difference in the outcome, but a half hour of lead time or 
a cardiologist in the OR wouldn’t hurt. 
Doctor 2.  I agree.  It isn’t enough for the surgeon to be technically competent.  The 
surgeon needs to be able to be aware of what’s going on around him.  In aviation, they 
call that situational awareness. 
Doctor 3.  I agree too.  And this is more than the old “captain of the team” issue.  The 
operating room is a complex place that requires frequent assessment of what is going on.  
The surgeon needs to be part of the solution. 
Doctor 1.  Finally, I think we have learned from experience that an incorrect sponge 
count is usually an incorrect sponge count.  Most hospitals have protocols that require 
that a film is taken before the patient leaves the OR.  I myself would have started closing 
the abdomen while they were getting x-ray.  We would have had the film back before the 
skin was closed.  If there were a sponge, and I’m pretty sure there was, we could have 
removed it while the patient was still in the OR. 
Doctor 2.  True.  But I think it’s more than that.  A missing sponge is one of those 
problems that you can’t talk your way out of.  Surgeons really need to be more involved 
in paying attention to where sponges are left.  It’s one of those details that can avoid a  
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Appendix 9.  (Continued) 
lawsuit.  Whenever I place a sponge in the abdomen, I make sure I tell the scrub nurse 
that there is a sponge in the abdomen.  It doesn’t take any time, and it helps me keep 
track. 
Doctor 3.  I can’t disagree.  I was sued once.  Since then, keeping track of the sponges is 
one of those details I never overlook. 
Doctor 1.  So we agree that there was probably poor judgment in going ahead with the 
case. 
Doctor 2.  And we agree that the surgeon didn’t try to understand the situation when the 
anesthetist was obviously trying to find a clue. 
Doctor 3.  And unless the patient is really crashing, and you’re planning to come back, 
the surgeon needs to pay attention to details and follow the protocols.  
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Appendix 10.  Follow-up Scenario Script: Without Errors 
Follow-up script. 
Surgeon and resident at scrub sink: 
Surgeon:  Gee, Bob.  I really wish I didn’t have to do this case now after being up all 
night with that trauma patient. 
Resident:  This redo could be really complicated.  Why don’t we ask the OR supervisor 
and the nurse anesthetist if we can delay the case until this afternoon so that you can get 
some rest.  The patient isn’t asleep yet. 
Surgeon: You know, you may be right.  I recently read that fatigue leads to a significant 
deterioration in ability to function, but that individuals are often not aware of the 
impairment.  I would hate to harm this patient.  I’ll talk to the OR supervisor and nurse 
anesthetist, and if they agree I’ll talk to the patient about waiting til this afternoon. 
Fade out and fade into the middle of the surgical procedure.  The surgeons are in the 
middle of the operation.  The anesthetist is behind the ether screen, but visible.  The scrub 
nurse is there, next to the surgeon.  The surgeons appear to be working deep in the pelvis.   
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you losing much blood down there? 
Surgeon:  Nope, everything is pretty dry.  Is everything okay up there? 
Short time passes 
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you sure you’re not losing blood? 
Surgeon: Suzie, why don’t I stop what I’m doing for a moment and let you figure out 
what’s going on.  (short pause) Is there anything that I can do to help you? (short pause) 
Perhaps we should get the anesthesiologist as well.  Maybe three heads are better than 
one. 
Nurse Anesthetist:  Well there is no doubt that something is going on.  Since you don’t 
think it’s due to blood loss, I guess we need to look into this further.  Let’s get Dr. 
Roberts (looking toward presumed location of circulating nurse). 
Anesthesiologist:  Well, well.  What do we have here.  I think we better look for some 
other options.  Just glancing at the monitor, I wonder if we might have an evolving acute  
cardiac event.    Let’s get some cardiac enzymes.  And let’s look at the medications 
we’ve given.   And let’s start treating him for acute ischemia.  And we better wrap up this 
operation as quickly as we can. 
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Appendix 10.  (Continued) 
Fade out, fade in.  Still in the OR. 
Scrub nurse: It looks like we’re missing a sponge, doctor. 
Surgeon: Can you quickly recheck the count.  Since it looks like our patient may have 
had an MI, we really need to get to the intensive care unit as soon as we can.  And you 
better call x-ray right away so that we don’t lose any time.  I can start closing while we’re 
waiting for the film.   
Scrub nurse: You told me to remind you that you put a sponge up over the liver.  Did you 
take that one out?   
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Appendix 11.  Fact Sheet - STAN, the METI Human Patient Simulator 
Human Patient Simulator™ by Medical Education Technologies, Inc.™ (METI™) 
METI’s HPS-- Human Patient Simulator: Known as Stan (short for Stan D. Ardman or 
Standard Man) is a virtual patient capable of simulating nearly any possible human medical 
emergency including allergic reactions, the effects of nerve gas or weapons of mass 
destruction, drug overdoses, a severed limb or other traumatic injuries. 
Creating a real life or death situation: Able to recognize and respond to medical treatment 
and drugs, once an emergency scenario is started, Stan becomes a real “life” placed in the 
hands of students that must diagnose and administer the correct treatment. Mistakes can send 
Stan into cardiac arrest and result in death, thus making any scenario, truly, life or death. 
Lifelike human characteristics: Each Stan unit is built to simulate human characteristics and 
functions including blinking and dilating eyes, tearing, drooling, bleeding, pulsing, inhaling 
oxygen, exhaling carbon dioxide (with chest movement), talking, urinating, swelling tongue, etc. 
Interactive Simulation: The Stan is completely interactive. Instructors use software to enter 
various emergency scenarios for which students are challenged to recognize according to the 
simulator’s actions. The simulator then responds directly to the treatment as administered by 
the students. No interaction from the instructor is needed once the program has begun. 
Students can practice skills over and over again until mastery is achieved. 
Emergency Scenarios: METI has designed Stan to simulate physical (bleeding, pupil dilation) 
and physiological (pulse, heartbeat) characteristics for 100s of possible medical emergency 
situations. 
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Appendix 11.  (Continued) 
Who uses METI: Over 700 organizations worldwide utilize METI’s technology including NASA, 
Center for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. and foreign military, leading medical schools such as 
Harvard, UCLA, Cleveland Clinic, Mount Sinai, Stanford and more. 
Emergency Training Facts: The majority of emergency professionals enter the field having 
only practiced on lifeless mannequins and do not experience their first real emergency situation 
until after they have completed training and enter the workforce. 
Training uses: Emergency preparedness, Disaster Training, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Bio Terrorism, Advanced Disaster Life Support, Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Advanced 
Trauma Life Support and more. 
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Appendix 12.  Simulation Script: Recovery Room  
Actors: PACU nurse, possibly anesthesiologist 
Equipment: bed, patient, monitor (BP,HR), IV apparatus, chart, anesthesia record, preop 
record, EKG with acute MI from different patient, drugs (Beta blocker, levophed, 
epinephrine, oxygen,  
Patient has been in the PACU for about an hour after a laparoscopic cholecystectomy.  
Unknown to the PACU nurse, the surgeon had bleeding from the cystic artery, which 
stopped spontaneously, and the cystic artery was never clipped.  The surgeon and resident 
who did the procedure are scrubbed in the OR on another case.  The PACU paged the 
resident doing the simulation, who has never met the patient and was not present during 
the operation, but is on the general surgery service. 
Nurse: Thanks for coming doctor.  This is Mister Bob Smith.  He is 65 years old.  He 
underwent a laparoscopic cholecystectomy today and has been here in the PACU for 
about 45 minutes.  Dr. Miller did the operation, but he is scrubbed on another procedure 
in OR 3.  The patient has been a little tachycardic since arrival and has received two 500 
cc boluses of fluid.  His blood pressure has been running between 90 and 100 the whole 
time and didn’t seem to come up with fluid.  The PACU anesthesiologist increased the 
maintenance IV fluids to 150 ml/hr and ordered an EKG.  I gave Mister Smith 2 mg of IV 
morphine and his systolic fell to 70.  We gave him another 500 cc of saline, but his 
pressure is still 70.  He was complaining of some pain in his xyphoid area before the 
morphine. 
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